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INTRODUCTION
In 1967, the United States House of Representatives refused to seat Con-
gressman-elect Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. for alleged misappropriation of funds
during the previous Congress. Powell took his case to the Supreme Court,
which held that a single house of Congress, under its power to judge the quali-
fications of its members, could not impose qualifications in addition to those
contained in the Qualifications Clauses of the Constitution, Article I, Section
2, Clause 2, and Section 3, Clause 3. In reaching its conclusion, the Court
surveyed the historical record and determined that the Qualifications Clauses
were intended to be exclusive.'
Between 1990 and 1994, twenty-two states imposed a term limit, or
length-of-service qualification, of one form or another on their representatives
in Congress.3 A handful of state and lower federal courts found such efforts
unconstitutional, citing the Powell Court's conclusion about the exclusivity of
the Qualifications Clauses.' Indeed, the Nevada Supreme Court refused even
to let that state's measure on the ballot; it was, according to the court, "palpa-
bly" unconstitutional under Powell.' This past term, the United States Su-
preme Court agreed in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, a split 5-4 decision,
invalidating an Arkansas term limits provision because it effectively imposed a
qualification for office and, according to the Court's reading of the "historical
and textual evidence,"..."neither Congress nor the States ... possess the
power to supplement the exclusive qualifications set forth in the text of the
Constitution."6 In Term Limits, the Court relied heavily on the historical as-
sessment made by the Powell Court.' The purpose of this article is to review
and assess some of the history upon which the Powell Court relied by looking
at the four principal debates in Congress over contested elections in which a
state-imposed qualification was at issue.
1. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969).
2. Id. at 522-48.
3. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Rethinking Term Limits for Federal Legislators in Light of the
Structure of the Constitution, 73 OR. L. REV. 561, 561 & n.3 (1994) (citing Direct Voice, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 10, 1994, at A7.).
4. E.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 356 (Ark. 1994), affd sub nom.
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995); Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp.
1068, 1076 (W.D. Wash.), affd sub nom. Thorsted v. Munro, Nos. 94-35222 etc., 1996 WL 4397
(9th Cir. Jan. 4, 1996).
5. Stumpf v. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 122 (Nev. 1992).
6. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1866. This article was prepared prior to the Court's ruling in
Term Limits. Its assessment of the historical record nevertheless remains valid; I have incorporated
references to the Term Limits opinion where appropriate.
7. See id. at 1848-52.
[Vol. 73:1
OPEN TO MERIT OF EVERY DESCRIPTION?
I. THE CONTESTED ELECTION CASES
A. Barney v. McCreery (1807)
The Powell Court's treatment of the first of these debates, the 1807 con-
tested election case of Barney v. McCreery, was faulty, citing for its conclu-
sion a Committee of Elections report that was rejected by the whole House.8
William McCreery's election was challenged for his alleged failure to meet a
city residency requirement imposed by Maryland law.9 The U.S. Constitution
requires that a representative be an inhabitant of the state," and the House
Committee of Elections expressed the view that the Maryland law was uncon-
stitutional because it imposed an additional qualification.' Citing the report
of the Committee of Elections, the Powell Court concluded that it was then
settled "that the States have not a right to require qualifications from mem-
bers, different from, or in addition to, those prescribed in the constitution.""
The actual record of the debates, however, shows that the basis of the
House's decision was much less clear than the Powell Court suggested. 3 A
lengthy debate arose over the report proffered by the Committee of Elections,
which had claimed that, since the Article I qualifications were exclusive, the
additional restriction imposed by the Maryland law was unconstitutional and
McCreery was therefore entitled to his seat. During the debate, several mem-
bers of the House argued that McCreery was eligible to represent Baltimore
because he was a resident of the city of Baltimore, as required by the Mary-
land law; 4 indeed, the report of the Elections Committee was recommitted so
that the Committee could take additional evidence as to McCreery's actual
8. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 542-43 (1969) (quoting from 17 ANNALS OF
CONG. 871 (1807)). The Term Limits Court compounded the error made by the Powell Court.
While the Powell Court merely relied on a report by the Committee on Elections that was rejected
by the House, the Term Limits Court stated affirmatively and erroneously that "[t]he whole
House ... did not vote on the Committee's report." Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1861.
9. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 871 (1807). An act passed by the Maryland legislature in Novem-
ber 1802 gave the Baltimore district two representatives; it also required that one be a resident of
the County of Baltimore, the other of the City of Baltimore. Id. (Report of the House Committee
of Elections).
10. "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty
five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected,
be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (empha-
sis added).
11. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 871 (1807). Most of the debate is also reprinted in M. ST. CLAIR
CLARKE & DAVID A. HALL, CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, FROM THE YEAR
1789 TO 1834, at 167-221 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834).
12. CLARKE & HALL, supra note 11, at 171; see Powell, 395 U.S. at 542-43.
13. See 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 870-920; 1231-38 (1807). Indeed, the Term Limits majority
conceded that "the House Debate may be inconclusive." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115
S. Ct. 1842, 1861 (1995). Oddly, the majority attempted to minimize the inconclusive nature of
the McCreery debates by citing an 1814 letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Cabell for the
proposition that "commentators at the time apparently viewed the seating of McCreery as confir-
mation of the States' lack of power to add qualifications." Id. Jefferson's position in the letter
which the majority cited, however, was that the States have power to impose additional qualifica-
tions. See infra text accompanying note 246.
14. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 890 (1807) (Rep. Montgomery); id. at 905 (Rep. Bibb).
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residence. 5 Others were uncertain whether the Maryland law required a
twelve-month residency in the city, or merely residency at the time of the
election. 6 Concerns were also expressed that it was only McCreery's mem-
bership in the previous Congress that prevented him from residing in the city
of Baltimore, and hence, that the purpose of the residency law was not violat-
ed. 7 Still others suggested that, although the Maryland legislature could not
add qualifications, the people of Maryland, by way of an amendment to the
Maryland constitution, could.'
The House ultimately seated McCreery by a vote of 89 to 18, but only
after severing the resolution from the Committee of Elections' reported ratio-
nale.' 9 The resolution to seat McCreery was originally reported by the Com-
mittee as follows: "Resolved, That William McCreery [having the greatest
number of votes and being duly qualified, agreeably to the Constitution of the
United States,] is entitled to his seat in this House."2 The bracketed words
were struck in the Committee of the Whole, however, and the House approved
the deletion by a decisive vote of 70 to 37.2
John Randolph of Virginia then moved to amend the resolution so as to
read, "Resolved, That William McCreery, not being qualified according to the
law of Maryland, is not entitled to his seat in this House. 22 When
Randolph's motion was ruled out of order, he moved instead to insert the
phrase, "being duly qualified by the law of Maryland," in lieu of the previous-
ly deleted clause in order "to bring the question of the constitutionality of the
law of Maryland before the House."23 Randolph's motion did not accomplish
his purpose, however, for it did not squarely present the constitutional issue,
and the confusion it engendered would render any conclusion on the constitu-
tional question suspect. Francis Gardner of New Hampshire, for example,
stated that he "found himself considerably perplexed" by the amendment,
which he thought required him to vote to seat McCreery on principles other
than those he supported, lest a negative vote deprive McCreery of his seat
altogether. 24 Randolph himself voted against the amendment,25 although the
15. Id. at 898 (Rep. Randolph).
16. Id. at 890, 905 (Rep. Bibb). By an act passed in November 1790, Maryland required that
representatives be residents of their district for twelve months prior to election. Id. at 871. It was
unclear whether the 1802 Act, discussed supra note 9, retained the twelve-month residency re-
quirement.
17. Id. at 905 (Rep. Bibb). McCreery had a summer home in Baltimore County, and a winter
residence in Baltimore City, which he apparently ceased to occupy during the Ninth Congress
when he and his family took up residence in Washington, D.C. Id. at 871.
18. Id. at 897 (Rep. Johnson). Representative Findley, the chairman of the Committee of
Elections, made a similar argument, although he also argued that the Article I list of qualifications
was exclusive. Id. at 876.
19. Id. at 1238.
20. Id. at 1231.
21. Id. at 1231-32. The record of votes only identifies 69 members in support of the resolu-
tion. See id. at 1232. It is unclear, therefore, whether one member voting in favor was not listed,
or whether the number was miscounted.
22. Id. at 1233.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1237.
25. Id.
[Vol. 73:1
OPEN TO MERIT OF EVERY DESCRIPTION?
proper course of action suggested by his statements during the debate would
have been to vote for the amendment, then against the resolution as amend-
ed.26 Randolph's amendment failed by a vote of 8 to 92, after which a vote
on the unencumbered resolution simply stating that McCreery was entitled to
his seat was approved 89 to 18.27
It is possible to dissect the final vote a little further. The eighteen mem-
bers who voted against seating McCreery must have thought him ineligible
under a constitutionally valid Maryland law, since no other rationale was of-
fered.2" Of the eighty-nine members who voted to seat McCreery, fifty had
also voted to strike the Election Committee's rationale from the resolution,
while only twenty-five had voted to retain it.29 We can safely assume that
most, if not all, of the latter twenty-five thought the Qualifications Clauses
exclusive; all eleven from that group who participated in the debate so ar-
gued."0
The group of fifty who voted to seat McCreery and voted to strike the
Committee rationale is more difficult to assess, however. Only six members of
this group spoke during the debate; three clearly thought the states had the
right to impose additional qualifications3 and a fourth implied as much,32
but the other two expressed the desire to avoid deciding the constitutional
issue if at all possible. 3 Significantly, not a single member who spoke in
favor of the exclusivity of the Qualifications Clauses voted to strike the
Committee's rationale.34 If we could extrapolate the views of the debate par-
ticipants to this entire group of fifty, we might estimate that two-thirds, or
thirty-three members, voted to seat McCreery because he was qualified under
a constitutionally valid Maryland law, while one-third, or seventeen members,
voted to seat him because he was so qualified, whether or not the law was
constitutional, an issue which they wanted to avoid deciding. That would leave
26. See id. at 882-86, 888-89, 1233, 1236 (Rep. Randolph's statements made during the
debates). Compare Randolph's vote with that of Lemuel Sawyer of North Carolina, who argued
for the states' right to add qualifications, id. at 880-81, who thought McCreery unqualified on that
ground, id. at 881, and who voted for Randolph's amendment. Id. at 1237.
27. Id.
28. Of these 18, only Randolph spoke during the debate, and he argued that McCreery was
not eligible under Maryland law. Id. at 1236. Neither party affiliation, state of residence, or region
of the country correlate to the vote in a way that would provide an alternate explanation.
29. The remaining 14 members who voted to seat McCreery had not voted on the initial
amendment to strike the Committee's rationale. Id. at 1232, 1237-38.
30. Randolph also voted against the initial amendment to strike the Committee rationale. Id.
at 1232. He is not among this group of 25 because he voted against the final resolution, id. at
1238, but his vote is nonetheless anomalous with his stated position. See id. at 882-86, 888-89,
1233, 1236 (Rep. Randolph's statements during the debates). Two possible explanations suggest
themselves: (I) Randolph may have thought an affirmative vote would suggest he believed
McCreery was entitled to his seat (an assumption he seems to have made regarding his own
amendment); or (2) he may have voted to retain the initial language because he believed it was
correct, though not complete. McCreery was, after all, eligible under the constitutional qualifica-
tions. It was his state law eligibility that Randolph thought infirm. Id. at 1236.
31. See id. at 904-05 (Rep. Bibb); id. at 899-902 (Rep. Love); id. at 1232 (Rep. Sloan).
32. Representative Montgomery of Maryland argued that McCreery had been a resident of
Baltimore City since 1803, id. at 890, but also that he would never consent to the House of Rep-
resentatives judging the constitutionality of a state law. Id. at 1233.
33. Id. at 904 (Rep. Gardenier); id. at 1232 (Rep. Rhea).
34. See id. at 870-920, 1231-38.
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fifty-one who thought the states had power to add qualifications (eighteen who
voted not to seat McCreery, plus an estimated thirty-three who voted to seat
him), as compared to forty-two who either thought the Qualifications Clauses
exclusive or who wanted to avoid deciding the constitutional issue.
Of course, any such extrapolation is highly speculative. 5 The only thing
one can assert with any confidence is that twenty-two members thought the
states could add qualifications (the eighteen who voted against McCreery plus
the four debate participants who voted both to seat McCreery and to delete the
Election Committee's rationale),36 while twenty-eight thought the states could
not add qualifications (the twenty-five who voted both to seat McCreery and
to retain the Election Committee's rationale, plus three debate participants who
expressed the view that the Qualifications Clauses were exclusive but who did
not cast a vote when the Election Committee's rationale was deleted)) 7 The
views of the remaining fifty-seven members" who voted to seat McCreery
are impossible to ascertain from the debates. To the extent their views and
votes correlate with the views and votes of those who did speak, however, the
debates at least suggest that there may have been a majority in the House who
believed the states did have the power to impose additional qualifications on
their representatives to Congress.
B. Lyman Trumbull (1855)
The next major debate to occur in Congress over the power of states to
add qualifications to those enumerated in the Constitution occurred in the
Senate in 1856. The Illinois Constitution of 1848 contained the following
clause:
The judges of the supreme and circuit courts shall not be eligible to
any other office or public trust, of profit, in this State, or the United
States, during the term for which they are elected, nor for one year
thereafter. All votes for either of them for any elective office, (except
35. There obviously need not be a correlation between the views of those who spoke during
the debate and those who did not; the 4:2 ratio need not hold, therefore, over the whole group of
50. Some evidence suggests that the ratio was even higher: the only other member who spoke
during the debate and who voted to strike the Committee rationale, Lemuel Sawyer of North Caro-
lina, clearly supported the right of states to add qualifications. Id. at 879-82. Other plausible ex-
planations for voting to delete the Election Committee's rationale would suggest the ratio was
lower: some members who thought the Qualifications Clauses were exclusive might have voted to
strike the Election Committee's rationale either to accommodate the concerns of their colleagues
or because they thought it superfluous. Without a more comprehensive review of the views of
non-speaking members, however, the extrapolation from those who did speak is at least as
plausible as any other mechanism by which we might ascertain the views of the non-speaking
members.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 31-32.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30, 34.
38. This number includes 46 from the group of 50 who voted to seat McCreery and to delete
the Election Committee's rationale (the remaining four having spoken in favor of the state's right
to add qualifications), see supra text accompanying notes 29, 31-32, plus 11 of the 14 who voted
to seat McCreery but who did not vote on the amendment deleting the Election Committee's ratio-
nale (the other three having spoken for reading the Qualifications Clauses as exclusive).
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that of judge of the supreme or circuit court,) given by the general
assembly, or the people, shall be void."
In November 1854, former judges Lyman Trumbull and Samuel Marshall were
elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. Both of their elections were con-
tested as in violation of the Illinois constitutional provision, but after a very
brief debate, the challenges were rebuffed by a vote of 125 to 5, approving a
Committee of Elections report finding the Illinois provision unconstitutional
because the Qualifications Clauses were exclusive.' In the interim, however,
Lyman Trumbull was elected by the Illinois General Assembly to a seat in the
U.S. Senate, and a more substantial debate as to the constitutionality of the
provision arose there.
Trumbull was ultimately seated by a vote of 35 to 8, but as in the
McCreery case, the rationale on which the vote was based is a mixed one."
The case was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, which reported back
after more than two months that the members of the committee were too di-
vided in their opinions to reach a decision on the matter.42 Senator John
Crittenden of Kentucky then offered the following resolution during floor
debate:
Resolved, That Lyman Trumbull is entitled to a seat in this body as a
Senator, elected by the Legislature of the State of Illinois, for the
term of six years from the 4th of March, 1855." 3
The resolution does not squarely present the constitutional issue, as Crittenden
himself recognized, since it enabled Senators to vote to seat Trumbull either
because he was qualified pursuant to the Illinois Constitution, or because the
Illinois provision was unconstitutional and therefore void." Crittenden argued
vigorously that Trumbull was entitled to his seat under both rationales.45
39. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, § 10, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND
COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 999 (Francis N.
Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter THORPE].
40. See CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, FROM 1834 TO 1865, at 166-68 (D.
W. Bartlett ed., Washington, GPO 1865) [hereinafter CONTESTED ELECTIONS]. The Committee
Report relied principally on the constitutional commentaries of Chancellor Kent and Joseph Story.
Id. at 167-68.
41. D. W. Bartlett, the Clerk to the Committee of Elections and editor of the 1865 volume of
Cases of Contested Elections in Congress, states that "[tihe argument in favor of Mr. Trumbull's
fight to the seat proceeded upon the ground that the people of Illinois could not add to the qualifi-
cations of a senator as prescribed in the Constitution of the United States." CONTESTED ELEC-
TIONS, supra note 40, at 621. As described below, Bartlett's summary is erroneous.
42. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 514 (1856) (Sen. Butler) ("The result of the discus-
sion [in Committee] has been such a division of opinion as to render it proper, in the opinion of
the committee, that the case should be referred to the Senate .
43. Id. at 515.
44. Id. at 549.
45. Id. at 547-48. Crittenden asserted:
The fast question ... that presents itself is, whether upon ... a proper construction of
the constitution of the State of Illinois, [Trumbull] is entitled to his seat.... I con-
tend ... that, according to the fair and rational construction of this instrument, it does
not apply to the case of an officer who resigned more than twelve months before his
election to the Senate.
1995]
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Trumbull himself argued primarily that he was in conformity with the Illinois
constitutional provision, having resigned more than eighteen months prior to
his election,' although he also argued that the Illinois provision was void,
that the Senate should defer to the state legislature's interpretation of the
provision, and that the provision was intended only to apply to state offi-
cers.
47
Significantly, Senators Stephen Adams of Mississippi and John Hale of
New Hampshire both argued that the power of the Senate under Article I,
Section 5 to judge the elections of its members was limited to judging the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution itself, but that "the State tribunals
are the exclusive judges of the qualifications required by their own constitu-
tion."' How extensive was the support for this position cannot be ascer-
tained, although more than half (five out of nine) of the Senators speaking in
favor of seating Trumbull found him eligible under the Illinois provision,
either because they had ascertained for themselves that it did not cover
Trumbull's case, or because they deferred to the implicit finding of the Illinois
General Assembly to that effect. 9 A late attempt by Charles Stuart of Michi-
gan to amend Crittenden's resolution so as to clarify the rationale on which it
was passed, "for the purpose of providing for future reference," was ruled out
of order, and the matter was dropped." The grounds upon which Trumbull
was seated thus cannot be determined with any certainty."
Id. at 548. He further maintained that "[tihe very enumeration [in the U.S. Constitution) of these
qualifications excludes the idea that [the Framers] intended any other qualifications."
Id. Senator Foot (R-VT) also made both arguments. Id. at 579-82.
46. Id. at 58, 343, 467.
47. Id. at 467-68.
48. Id. at 582.
49. Three of the five also argued, at least in part, that the Qualifications Clauses in the Con-
stitution were exclusive.
50. Id. at 583-84. Senator Stuart's amendment read: "For the reason that the said Lyman
Trumbull, having resigned the office of judge more than one year previous to his election as Sena-
tor, is, in the opinion of the Senate, thereby relieved from the inhibition contained in the constitu-
tion of the State of Illinois." Id. at 583. The reporter states that "[e]xpressions of dissent were
heard all round the Chamber." Id. Senator Stuart himself stated that he did not wish to pursue the
matter because "the sense of the Senate seems to be against the proposition," but it cannot be
determined from the recorded debate whether the Senate was against Stuart's amendment because
it thought the Illinois provision unconstitutional, or because it wished to avoid the constitutional
issue. See id. at 584.
51. Another complication, not raised during the debate, was that the second-place finisher,
Illinois Governor Joal A. Matteson, was also disqualified under another provision of the 1848
Illinois Constitution. Matteson received 47 votes to Trumbull's 51, with one vote cast for a third
candidate, Archibald Williams. CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1855). The Illinois Consti-
tution of 1848 provided that "the governor ... shall not be eligible ... to any other office until
after the expiration of the term for which he was elected." ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. 1II, § 3, re-
printed in 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 995. Although it might be argued that this disqualification
only applied to state offices, a similar provision clearly rendered members of the Illinois General
Assembly ineligible to the United States Senate:
No person elected to the general assembly shall receive any civil appointment within
this State, or to the senate of the United States, from the governor, the governor and
senate, or from the general assembly, during the term for which he shall have been
elected; and all such appointments, and all votes given for any such member for any
such office or appointment, shall be void.
ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. III, § 7, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 987 (emphasis added).
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C. Wood v. Peters (1884)
Five years after the decision to seat Senator Trumbull, Kansas was admit-
ted to the Union with a constitutional provision nearly identical to the Illinois
provision at issue in Trumbull's case.52 As was common, the enabling act for
Kansas required that its constitution be in conformity with the U.S. Constitu-
tion, and the Kansas Constitution was carefully scrutinized before Congress
admitted the state into the Union. 3
In the November 1882 election, however, a sitting state district court
judge, Samuel Peters, was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives as one
of four members elected by the state on a general ticket.54 Samuel Wood,
who placed fifth in the general election (more than 16,000 votes behind Pe-
ters), challenged Peters's eligibility under the Kansas Constitution.5 The
Committee of Elections reported a resolution as follows:
Resolved, That S. R. Peters was duly elected a member of Congress
from the State of Kansas, and is entitled to his seat.56
Representative Risden Bennett of North Carolina proposed a substitute resolu-
tion on behalf of the minority of the Committee, as follows:
Resolved, That Samuel R. Peters, of Kansas, is ineligible to the seat
in the House of Representatives of the Forty-eighth Congress now
held by him.
Resolved, That Samuel N. Wood, of Kansas, is entitled to said
seat. 7
A short debate occurred in which the principal interlocutors were Wood
and Peters themselves and two members of the Election Committee, Repre-
sentatives Mortimer Elliott of Pennsylvania and Risden Bennett of North Caro-
lina. The entire debate occupies less than seven pages in the Congressional
Record, although Wood's two-hour speech occupies an additional twenty-two
pages in the Appendix.58 Bennett's substitute resolution was ultimately divid-
ed, with a separate vote taken on each of the two clauses. The first clause
declaring Peters ineligible failed by a vote of more than five to one.59 The
52. The Kansas Constitution of 1859 disqualified judges and justices from holding "any
other office of profit or trust under the authority of the state, or the United States, during the term
of office for which said justices and judges shall be elected .... " KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. III,
§ 13, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 1249-50.
53. Indeed, three prior Kansas constitutions had been rejected (the Topeka Constitution of
1855, the Lecompton Constitution of 1857, and the Leavenworth Constitution of 1858) because of
the intensity of the dispute over slavery. See 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 1179-241 (reprinting the
Kansas constitutions).




58. See id at 3296-303. Bennett's speech is not reprinted in the main body of the Congres-
sional Record, but a reference to the Appendix is made. Id. at 3301. The Appendix, however, does
not contain a speech by Bennett on the subject.
59. 106 noes to 20 ayes. Id. at 3303.
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
second vote failed by an almost unanimous vote, with only two members
voting to seat Wood.6'
The original committee resolution was then approved on a voice vote,
Bennett's call for a recorded vote having failed. Although Peters suggested
that he had not violated the spirit of the Kansas constitutional provision, and
further that the constitutional provision was hortatory only,6' those claims
were relatively weak and the principal argument for seating Peters made by
both Peters and Elliott was that the Kansas provision was unconstitutional. The
House's decision to seat Peters seems to rest, therefore, unambiguously on the
ground that the states do not have power to impose additional qualifications on
members of Congress.
D. Brigham Roberts (1899)
Despite the unambiguous nature of the decision by the Forty-eighth Con-
gress to seat Judge Peters, the Fifty-sixth Congress afforded that decision no
precedential weight a mere fifteen years later when it overwhelmingly refused
to seat Brigham Roberts, the representative-elect from Utah. 62 Roberts was a
polygamist, and the House appointed a special committee to address Roberts's
"statutory disqualification, created by the Edmunds law,63 and for higher and
graver and quite as sound reasons."64 The report by the majority of the spe-
cial committee recommended against seating Roberts6" and its recommenda-
tion was approved by the House by a vote of 268 to 50.' The majority's
position rested on three alternative grounds: (1) The House has an inherent
power to exclude a "defiant violator of law" and Roberts was thus ineligible
because of his violation of Utah law against polygamy; 67 (2) Roberts was dis-
qualified under the Edmunds Law, which specifically made polygamy a dis-
qualification for office;' and (3) The people of Utah, in electing Roberts, had
violated the understanding regarding the anti-polygamy condition under which
they were admitted to the union.69
60. Id. (The "nay" votes were not taken).
61. Id. at 3300.
62. 33 CONG. REC. 1072-104, 1123-49, 1175-217 (1899). The majority report, the minority
report, and the debate participants failed to even mention the Peters case, although nearly every
other Congressional precedent was cited. See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-2.
63. Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 47, § 8, 22 Stat. 30, 31-32 (Congressional act outlawing po-
lygamy in United States territories).
64. 33 CONG. REC. 5 (1899) (statement of Rep. Taylor).
65. H. R. REP. No. 85, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1900). Much of the House report is
reprinted in I ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 474-480 (1907).
66. 33 CONG. REC. 1217 (1899); 1 HINDS, supra note 65, § 480, at 560.
67. 1 HINDS, supra note 65, § 479, at 557.
68. 1 id. § 478, at 550.
69. 1 id. § 480, at 558 ("His election as Representative is an explicit and most offensive
violation of the understanding by which Utah was admitted as a State."); see also I id. § 480, at
559 (statement of Sen. Rawlins) ("[l]t is in the last degree a violation of the agreement or under-
standing when that State sends to Congress a man who is himself engaged in the persistent prac-
tice of the very thing the abandonment of which was the condition precedent to its admission
... .").
[Vol. 73:1
OPEN TO MERIT OF EVERY DESCRIPTION?
These three propositions can be recharacterized to address the Qualifica-
tions Clause issues directly, as follows: (1) whether a single house of Con-
gress, exercising its power to judge the qualifications of its members,7" can
create qualifications for office in addition to those in the Qualifications Claus-
es; (2) whether Congress as a whole can, by statute, create additional qualifi-
cations; and (3) whether a state, either by law or constitutional provision, can
add qualifications.
The Roberts debate turned principally on the first proposition. The majori-
ty thought it could exclude Roberts from Congress before he took the oath of
office, thus effectively creating an ad hoc disqualification under the House's
power to judge the qualifications of its members.7' The minority, on the other
hand, insisted that the House, acting alone, had power only to judge, not to
create, qualifications,72 although it believed that the House did have the pow-
er to expel Roberts under Article I, Section 5, Clause 2." Significantly, sev-
eral members who supported the minority report thought that the Congress as
a whole could probably impose additional qualifications,74 but that Congress
had not done so with the Edmunds Act, which applied only to territories.75
70. "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. I (emphasis added).
71. 33 CONG. REC. 1123 (1899).
72. See, e.g., id. at 1084 (Rep. Littlefield).
73. Id. at 1084, 1123. The Constitution provides: "Each House may determine the Rules of
its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. Some members of the majority thought the
minority's argument for expulsion was merely a ruse, because House precedents suggested that a
member could only be expelled for acts committed while he was a member. See, e.g., 33 CONG.
REC. 1123 (1899) (statement of Rep. Powers) ("[lt is a universal rule ... that you can not expel
a member from the House for any offense committed prior to his election .... "). However, the
Supreme Court's decision in Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 43 (1885), finding polygamy to be
an ongoing "state and condition" rather than a prior act, gives credence to the minority position.
74. See 33 CONG. REC. 1085 (1899) (statement of Rep. Littlefield) (describing the problem
with the exclusion of John Wilkes from the British House of Commons as having been effected
"by a mere resolution of the House, and without the concurrence of the other branches of the
legislature"); id. at 1136 (statement of Rep. Lacey) (the proper remedy is expulsion "unless by law
or by the Constitution express ineligibility had been created for [polygamy)") (emphasis added);
id. at 1176 (Rep. Sims); id. at 1177 (Rep. Johnston). At least one member supporting the minority
report, however, thought that neither a single house nor Congress could add qualifications. Id. at
1147 (Rep. Wilson).
75. Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 47, § 8, 22 Stat. 30, 30; see also 33 CONG. REC. 1096 (1899)
(Rep. Littlefield). In 1882, the House had refused to seat delegate George Q. Cannon, from the
Territory of Utah, for violating the Edmunds Act. I HINDS, supra note 65, § 473, at 503.
Cannon's election had also been challenged in 1873, but the anti-polygamy statute in force at the
time did not contain a disqualification clause. Id. § 469, at 494. While the House was considering
the 1873 case, Congress passed a law adding polygamy to the list of disqualifications for dele-
gates to Congress. Act of June 16, 1874, H.R. 3679, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. (1874), reprinted in I
HINDS, supra note 65, § 469, at 498-99. The House Committee on Elections then found Cannon
ineligible, but the House voted not to consider the report. I HINDS, supra note 65, § 469, at 499-
500. In both cases, the House assumed that its power to judge the qualifications of a delegate was
the same as its power to judge the qualifications of a member. Representative Tayler of Ohio, on
the other hand, argued that since the Edmunds Act applied to United States territories, including
the District of Columbia, Roberts was ineligible when he arrived in Washington to take his seat in
Congress. 33 CONG. REC. 1081 (1899). But see id. at 1096 (Rep. Littlefield) (finding Taylor's
suggestion laughable).
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More significantly, the debate over the majority's third proposition im-
plied that both the majority and minority thought a state could add qualifica-
tions. Representative Tayler of Ohio, speaking for the majority, argued that the
ban on polygamy in the Utah Constitution" operated as a disqualification on
Utah's representatives to Congress." Tayler argued in addition that because
Congress had explicitly required the ban as a condition for admission to state-
hood, it was irrevocable without the concurrence of Congress.7" Representa-
tive Littlefield of Maine, speaking for the minority, argued instead that neither
the Utah Constitution nor Utah law actually made polygamy a disqualification
for office."
The ban on polygamy in the Utah Constitution of 1895 did not expressly
impose a disqualification for office,"' and the dispute between the majority
and minority was over the true intent of the clause, not whether the clause was
constitutional if it did impose such a disqualification."' In fact, the Utah Con-
stitution contained two other disqualifications: Article IV, section 6, rendering
"idiot[s], insane person[s], or person[s] convicted of treason or crime against
the elective franchise ... [in]eligible to hold office in this State"; and Arti-
cle VII, section 23, making the governor ineligible "for election to the Senate
of the United States during the term for which he shall have been elected
governor.' '" Although the Article IV provision, viewed in isolation, might
reasonably be interpreted as applying only to officials in state government, and
not to members of Congress, 4 the Article VII provision is an express dis-
qualification for a member of Congress. Nor can the latter clause be rational-
ized as merely a resign to run provision, for the governor is ineligible not just
while he is governor, but "during the term for which he shall have been elect-
ed governor." 5
As in the case of Kansas discussed above, the Utah Enabling Act required
that the forthcoming Utah Constitution "not be repugnant to the Constitution
76. "Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant of this State shall
ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship; but
polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited." UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. I1l, reprinted
in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3705 (emphasis added).
77. 33 CONG. REc. 1081 (1899).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1095; see also UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. 11I, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note
39, at 3705 (prohibiting polygamy forever); I HINDS, supra note 65, § 478, at 554 (citing Laws of
Utah, 1892, ch. VII, pg. 5, made applicable after statehood by UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. XXIV,
§ 2, which provided that all territorial laws were continued in force unless contrary to the new
constitution).
80. See UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. III, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3705.
81. Only Representative Snodgrass, a supporter of the minority report, suggested that a state
could not add qualifications: "[The organic laws of Utah] impose no disqualification for office;
and if they did, a single State thus operating alone can not effect an amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States." 33 CONG. REC. 1126 (1899). Snodgrass also stated, however, that mem-
bers of Congress were state officers, thus implying that they are subject to state control. Id.
82. UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. IV, § 6, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3705.
83. UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. VII, § 23, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3714.
84. This interpretation cannot be sustained when the clause is viewed in context, however,
since the Utah Constitution elsewhere defines state officers as including Representatives to Con-
gress. UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. XXIV, § 12, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3733.
85. UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. VII, § 23, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3714.
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of the United States." 6 The Utah Constitution was expressly so found in the
proclamation by President Grover Cleveland admitting Utah to the union. 7
Thus, both by proclamation of the President and the decision of the House in
the Roberts case, the clauses of the Utah Constitution imposing additional
qualifications on members of Congress were treated as constitutional. Signifi-
cantly, the majority report in the House found that Roberts met all three quali-
fications contained in Article I, Section 2, but nevertheless held him ineligible
because "the language of the constitutional provision, the history of its framing
in the Constitutional Convention, and its context clearly show that it can not
be construed to prevent disqualification for crime." 8
While the Roberts case might be distinguished from the McCreery,
Trumbull, and Peters cases because it alone involved a disqualification for
crime, 9 the arguments made in the three earlier cases by those who would
hold additional qualifications unconstitutional made no such distinction, and
most of the arguments made by the Roberts majority are equally applicable to
the earlier cases. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century the congressional
precedents are inconclusive. The decisions in both the McCreery case and the
Trumbull case were inconclusive on the constitutional issue of the states'
power to impose additional qualifications, and while the constitutional issue
was decisively decided in the Peters case, the House reversed itself fifteen
years later in the Roberts case when it recognized that not only states, but a
single house of Congress, could impose additional qualifications.
Although the outcomes in the four cases are inconsistent or ambiguous,
the debates that occurred are nevertheless useful for our purposes, since every
important argument both in support of and in opposition to the states having
power to impose additional qualifications was made and responded to at length
during the course of the debates. It is to the strength of those arguments that
we next turn.
86. Act of July 16, 1894, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at
3693-94.
87. "Whereas the constitution and government of said proposed State are republican in form,
[and] said constitution is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the Declara-
tion of Independence ... [it is hereby admitted to the union]." Proclamation of President Grover
Cleveland, January 4, 1896, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3700 (emphasis added).
Although the President's generalized finding might not be accorded great weight under normal
circumstances, given the intensity of the dispute over polygamy in Utah, and the explicit ban on
polygamy in the Utah Enabling Act enacted by Congress, it is probably safe to assume that partic-
ular attention was paid to the polygamy provision.
88.' 1 HINDS, supra note 65, § 476, at 522.
89. Indeed, the majority report stressed that feature of the case. See I id. § 476, at 522; 33
CONG. REC. 39-40 (1899) (Rep. Taylor). But see 33 CONG. REC. 1087 (1899) (statement of Rep.
Littlefield) (arguing that the distinction between a disqualification for crime and other disqualifica-
tions "is purely arbitrary and gratuitous").
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II. ARGUMENTS FOR INTERPRETING THE QUALIFICATIONS CLAUSES AS AN
EXCLUSIVE LIST OF QUALIFICATIONS
A. The Expressio Unius Principle of Interpretation
The most straightforward argument for treating the Qualifications Clauses
as exclusive derives from a common maxim of statutory interpretation:
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or, the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another. During the McCreery debate, Representative Lewis
Sturges of Connecticut stated the principle as follows: "[W]hen the Framers of
the Constitution undertook deliberately to enumerate the qualifications [in
Article I, Section 2, Clause 2], it was presumable they meant that no others
should be necessary. '"' Representative Mortimer Elliott of Pennsylvania
stated the principle even more clearly during the Peters debate:
The Constitution of the United States by this section prescribes
certain qualifications for the office of Representative in Congress,
and, having exercised the power, it has been exhausted, and neither
Congress nor the States can add other qualifications. It comes within
a well-settled rule of construction that the enumeration of certain
requisites of qualification is equivalent to a prohibition of authority to
impose others.9'
Moreover, as Representative Elliott pointed out, the expressio unius prin-
ciple was in the minds of the Framers during the federal convention.92 In re-
sponse to a motion by James Mason giving Congress the power to impose a
property qualification, John Dickinson stated, "I am against any recital of
qualifications in the Constitution. It is impossible to make a complete one, and
a partial one would by implication tie up the hands of the legislature from
supplying omissions."" Since the Constitution as finally adopted did contain
such a recital of qualifications, Dickinson's statement would seem to suggest
that the list "by implication" excludes all others.
There is a problem with this interpretation, however; Mason's proposal
was to give Congress the power to impose a property qualification.94 Appli-
cation of the expressio unius principle to his proposed clause would thus have
operated to limit Congress's ability to impose other qualifications,95 but
90. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 877 (1807); see also 33 CONG. REC. 1144 (1899) (Rep.
Crumpacker); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (1856) (Sen. Crittenden); id. at 579 (Sen.
Mason); id. at 580 (Sen. Foot); id. at 583 (Sen. Butler); 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 203 (Rep. Quincy).
91. 15 CONG. REC. 3297 (1884).
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing 5 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787, at 371 (Jonathan Elliot ed., New York, Burt Franklin 1888) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DE-
BATES)).
94. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 93, at 370.
95. Indeed, one member of the convention sought to amend the proposal by giving Congress
the power to impose all needed qualifications precisely because of concerns like Dickinson's. Id.
(statement of Mr. Gorham).
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would have provided no limitation on the states, which do not derive their
authority from the U.S. Constitution.
Dickinson also raised an expressio unius concern to the clause regulating
age and citizenship qualifications. Because that clause, which ultimately be-
came the Article I Qualifications Clauses, was not a grant of power to Con-
gress but rather a list of standing qualifications, application of the expressio
unius principle to it would operate to exclude the imposition of other qual-
ifications, whether imposed by Congress or by the states.96 Dickinson's com-
ments were addressed to the initial version of the clause, however, which was
phrased positively.97 It may therefore be a sufficient answer to the expressio
unius concern that the clause was rephrased in the negative form finally in-
cluded in Article L"H As the Roberts majority report stated, "the conclusion
seems reasonable, if not absolutely irresistible, that the change from the af-
firmative to the negative form was intentionally made and with the very pur-
pose of obviating such objections."
Even if the Qualifications Clauses are read as a positive list, it is not at all
clear that the expressio unius principle is properly applied so as to exclude all
other qualifications. Joseph Story, in his highly regarded Commentaries on the
Constitution, cautioned against the misapplication of the expressio unius prin-
ciple in constitutional interpretation."° Because of the importance of the doc-
trine, and because Story himself thought the doctrine applicable to the Qual-
ifications Clauses,' I cite Story's description of the expressio unius princi-
ple in its entirety:
Another rule of interpretation deserves consideration in regard to the
constitution. There are certain maxims, which have found their way,
96. A point made by the Term Limits Court. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct.
1842, 1850 n.9 (1995).
97. It read as follows:
Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age of twenty five years
at least; shall have been a citizen of [in] the United States for at least three years before
his election, and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State in which he
shall be chosen.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 178 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) [herein-
after FARRAND].
98. See infra part III.B. The Term Limits majority summarily rejected the negative phrasing
argument. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1849 n.8. Justice Thomas, in dissent, agreed "that the 'nega-
tive phrasing' of these Clauses has little relevance." Id. at 1885 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas, however, distinguished between the clause as originally phrased and the clause as finally
adopted on the one hand, and a clause that conveyed an exclusive formulation, on the other. As an
example of the latter, he gave: "Every Person who shall have attained to the age of twenty five
Years ... shall be eligible to be a Representative." Id. The former formulation, whether positively
or negatively phrased, established for Thomas only minimum qualifications. Id.
99. 1 HINDS, supra note 65, § 477, at 530.
100. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 448,
at 433 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833).
101. 2 id. § 625, at 101. Many of the contemporary opponents of term limits view Story's
reading of the Qualifications Clauses as dispositive. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his Term
Limits dissent, the Supreme Court has often found Story's views "more nationalist than the Con-
stitution warrants." Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1880 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (contrasting 2 STORY,
supra note 100, §§ 1063-1069 with Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851),
on whether the Commerce Clause gives exclusive power to Congress).
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not only into judicial discussions, but into the business of common
life, as founded in common sense and common convenience. Thus, it
is often said, that in an instrument a specification of particulars is an
exclusion of generals; or the expression of one thing is the exclusion
of another. Lord Bacon's remark, "that, as exception strengthens the
force of a law in cases not excepted, so enumeration weakens it in
cases not enumerated," has been perpetually referred to, as a fine
illustration. These maxims, rightly understood, and rightly applied,
undoubtedly furnish safe guides to assist us in the task of exposition.
But they are susceptible of being applied, and indeed are often inge-
niously applied, to the subversion of the text, and the objects of the
instrument. Thus, it has been suggested, that an affirmative provision
in a particular case excludes the existence of the like provision in
every other case; and a negative provision in a particular case admits
the existence of the same thing in every other case. Both of these
deductions are, or rather may be, unfounded in solid reasoning. Thus,
it was objected to the constitution, that, having provided for the trial
by jury in criminal cases, there was an implied exclusion of it in civil
cases. As if there was not an essential difference between silence and
abolition, between a positive adoption of it in one class of cases, and
a discretionary right (it being clearly within the reach of the judicial
powers confided to the Union) to adopt, or reject it in all or any other
cases. One might with just as much propriety hold, that, because
congress has power "to declare war," but no power is expressly given
to make peace, the latter is excluded; or that, because it is declared,
that "no bill of attainder, or ex post facto law shall be passed" by
congress, therefore congress possess in all other cases the right to
pass any laws. The truth is, that in order to ascertain, how far an
affirmative or negative provision excludes, or implies others, we must
look to the nature of the provision, the subject matter, the objects,
and the scope of the instrument. These, and these only, can properly
determine the rule of construction. There can be no doubt, that an
affirmative grant of powers in many cases will imply an exclusion of
all others. As, for instance, the constitution declares, that the powers
of congress shall extend to certain enumerated cases. This specifi-
cation of particulars evidently excludes all pretensions to a general
legislative authority. Why? Because an affirmative grant of special
powers would be absurd, as well as useless, if a general authority
were intended. In relation, then, to such a subject as a constitution,
the natural and obvious sense of its provisions, apart from any techni-
cal or artificial rules, is the true criterion of construction.
°0 2
Thus, as Story himself recognized, the expressio unius principle is not to be
applied as a technical or artificial rule of constitutional interpretation, but
rather should be applied only if the nature and purpose of the particular provi-
102. 1 STORY, supra note 100, § 448, at 433-35 (footnotes omitted).
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sion admits of such a construction. "" This qualification seems to have been
recognized as well by Senator Crittenden, who, during the Trumbull debate,
stated:
The very enumeration of these qualifications [in Article I, Section 3,
Clause 3] excludes the idea that they intended any other qualifica-
tions. That is the plain rule of ordinary construction; but, for a reason
above all technical considerations, it is applicable here. The object of
the Federal Constitution was to have a body framed by a uniform rule
throughout the United States ...."'
It is then to the nature and objects of the Qualifications Clauses that the pro-
ponents of exclusivity next turned.
B. The Nature of the Qualifications Clauses
The nature of the Qualifications Clauses, as viewed by the proponents of
an exclusive reading, was most succinctly stated during the McCreery debate
by Representative William Findley of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the Commit-
tee of Elections in the Tenth Congress:
The qualifications of the National Legislature are of a national
character, and as such must be uniform throughout the nation, and
prescribed by the authority of the nation, and by it exclusively; but no
State Legislature is vested with national authority, they cannot make
citizens for the nation, nor prescribe qualifications either for citizens
or for Executive officers of the nation, much less can they prescribe
qualifications for the National Legislature, other than the nation itself
has prescribed, nor abridge the Constitutional power of Congress to
decide on the qualifications of its own members, agreeably to the
rules prescribed by the Constitution; that authority, expressly vested
by the whole, cannot be abridged or changed by a part-by a seven-
teenth part of the nation."5
In Findley's view, both the national character of the Congress and the need for
uniformity of qualifications among its members rendered the nature of the
clause susceptible to the expressio unius principle." 6 Justice Story agreed,
103. 1 Id.
104. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (1856) (emphasis added).
105. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 873 (1807).
106. Id. The Term Limits majority relied heavily on this argument, finding that "[tihe Consti-
tution ... creates a uniform national body representing the interests of a single people." U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1864 (1995). The Court went on to state that al-
lowing individual States to set qualifications would "undermin[e] the uniformity and the national
character that the Framers envisioned and sought to ensure." Id. The Term Limits majority treats
the issue as an all-or-nothing proposition, however: "The Congress of the United States ... is not
a confederation of nations in which separate sovereigns are represented by appointed delegates,
but is instead a body composed of representatives of the people." Id. at 1863. The majority's
formulation ignored the distinction between "state people" and "national people," see infra text
accompanying notes 125-28, and thus ignored the possibility that the nature of the system estab-
lished in 1787 is partly national, partly confederal.
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and both seem on first glance to be fully supported on the uniformity point by
James Madison's important statement in Federalist 52:
The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and proper-
ly defined by the State constitutions [than those of the electors], and
being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been
very properly considered and regulated by the convention. A repre-
sentative of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years;
must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must, at
the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to repre-
sent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no office under
the United States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this
part of the federal government is open to merit of every description,
whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard
to property or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious
faith. 0 7
Madison's statement is not as unambiguous as it first appears, however; if one
considers that the setting of certain minimum qualifications only, such as age,
citizenship, and inhabitancy, was "susceptible of uniformity," the statement
takes on a different character. In fact, other qualifications were not only not
susceptible of uniformity, but were regulated in vastly different ways in the
existing state constitutions. Virginia, for example, jealously guarded her prop-
erty qualification, and the several states had different definitions even for the
uniform qualification of "inhabitancy."
That the Framers intended to establish only uniform minimum qualifica-
tions is implicit in an exchange that occurred in the Massachusetts Ratifying
Convention between General Thompson and Rufus King, a leading Federalist
and, like Madison, a member of the Federal Convention's Committee of Style.
Thompson asked why old age had not been made a disqualification for office.
King responded:
[I]t would not extend to all parts of the continent alike. Life ... in a
great measure, depends on climate. What in the Southern States
would be accounted long life, would be but the meridian in the
Northern; what here is the time of ripened judgment is old age there.
Therefore the want of such a disqualification cannot be made an ob-
jection to the Constitution."8
Thus, according to King, a maximum age was not made a national qualifica-
tion because, unlike the minimum age contained in the Qualifications Clauses,
it was not susceptible to uniformity. King did not deny that the states individu-
ally could add a maximum age qualification; in fact, his statement implied a
general understanding that they could."9
107. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
108. Debate in Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 93, at 36.
109. The last sentence of the passage from No. 52 of The Federalist suggests that Madison
may have held a contrary view. "Under [the] reasonable limitations [on age, citizenship, and state
residency] the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description
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Representative Findley also claimed during the McCreery debate that the
Qualifications Clauses were exclusive because of the national character of the
Congress." '" It was on this point that the most passionate arguments were
made on both sides, because not only the character of the Congress, but that
of the states as well, was implicated by Findley's claim. Representative John
Rowan of Kentucky, siding with Findley on the issue, stated that "the States
were to the Union what counties were to a State," or, in other words, that the
states were mere administrative divisions of a consolidated national govern-
ment.' To the strong states' rights men of Virginia, such statements were
so surprising as to warrant little argument in reply. Representative Love pro-
vided this brief response:
To gentlemen who hold these principles, who contended that this is a
great consolidated Government, possessing all the powers of legisla-
tion, extended as its empire is over a territory of various climates,
leading to various pursuits among its inhabitants, he could address no
argument, but had the consolation to believe that the day was past
when such doctrines could have their effect on the people of this
country.'"
Representative Philip Key of Maryland stated a more prudent version of
Rowan's argument, as follows: "Shall a portion of the people of the United
States, claiming their Representative under the Constitution of the United
States, be restricted in their choice by a State law?"'" For Key, members of
the House of Representatives represented not "the people of any particular
State, but the people of the United States generally."'"' Key's rationale, how-
ever, would allow the states to impose qualifications on its Senators, who
much more clearly represented particular states; ' 5 it is to that extent incon-
sistent because a parallel clause in the Constitution sets qualifications for
Senators." 6 His analysis is, moreover, hard to sustain even as applied to the
House, and is based on an erroneous reading of the Constitution. Key stated
that Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 provides that "the House of Representatives
shall consist of members chosen every second year by the people of the
.... "suggests that the qualifications were not only to be uniform but exclusive. THE FEDERALIST
No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Of course, the voters of a particular
state could effectively create an old age or property qualification merely by refusing, election after
election, to vote for anyone with the unwanted characteristics, thus causing a lack of uniformity in
Congress on those additional grounds. It is hard to see how a decision by the people of a particu-
lar state to bind themselves to such qualifications in advance of the election in any way decreases
uniformity. Madison's statement is important on the question of the objects of the Qualifications
Clauses, not their uniformity. Accordingly, it is further addressed below. See infra part II.C.
110. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 873 (1807).
111. Id. at 894.
112. Id. at 938.
113. Id. at 910.
114. Id. at 913.
115. During the Trumbull debate, Senator Pugh of Ohio argued that "[t]he House of Repre-
sentatives is a body which owes its existence to the Federal Constitution; but the Senate is only
the Congress of the Confederation remodeled." CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 550 (1856).
116. "No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years,
and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhab-
itant of that State for which he shall be chosen." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
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United States,""' 7 when in fact the clause actually provides for election by
the people of the several States."8
As Representative John Randolph of Virginia pointed out, Article I, Sec-
tion 2, Clause 1 is not the only clause of the Constitution which treats mem-
bers of the House as representatives of the people of particular states rather
than of the people as a whole:
The gentleman affirmed that in the Senate alone was to be found
any feature of a confederated Government. Did he forget, that in one
of its most important acts, the election of a President, the House of
Representatives voted by States? That at every session, they were
called over and sworn in by States; and it would be more in the spirit
of the Constitution, that the yeas and nays should be taken by
States."9
Randolph could have included two other provisions: "Representatives ... shall
be apportioned among the several States,"'' 20 and members of the House of
Representatives are to be chosen "by the People of the several States."''
Even today, despite the Supreme Court's "one man, one vote," holding in
Reynolds v. Sims,122 members of Congress represent vastly different numbers
of people because state lines are not crossed in the drawing of congressional
districts.
Representative Quincy countered by accusing Randolph of thinking that
the Constitution was a mere confederacy of the states, and pointed out that
"the language of the Constitution was not we the States, but we the people of
those states."' 23 If Randolph's views are susceptible to such a reading, 2 4
Quincy and Key give too little recognition to the states and fail to recognize a
crucial feature of the American system-that the people operate in two differ-
ent capacities, one as the people of a partly-sovereign state, the other as a
117. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 910 (1807) (emphasis added).
118. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. I (emphasis added). Although not misciting the clause, the
Term Limits majority makes a similar error, for it cites the clause to support the proposition that
Members of the House of Representatives are "chosen directly, not by the States, but by the peo-
ple," with the national people clearly implied. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct.
1842, 1863 (1995).
119. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 943 (1807). In his Term Limits concurrence, Justice Kennedy
recognized these clauses in which "the Constitution is solicitous of the prerogatives of the States,"
but denied that they "support[] the idea of state interference with the most basic relation between
the National Government and its citizens, the selection of legislative representatives." Term Limits,
115 S. Ct. at 1873.
120. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
121. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
122. 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964). The holding in Reynolds v. Sims applied only to the states,
but presumably would apply to federal reapportionments as well under the implied equal protec-
tion component of the Fifth Amendment, see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), were it not
for the explicit constitutional provisions to the contrary. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1; U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
123. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 907 (1807) (emphasis in original).
124. Randolph did not actually claim the constitution was a confederacy, in so many words,
nor did his argument depend on such a claim, but his view of states' rights was certainly elaborat-
ed upon, and perhaps expanded, twenty years later by the nullification theorists, especially John C.
Calhoun.
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portion of the United States. As James Wilson stated during the Pennsylvania
Ratifying Convention:
I consider the people of the United States as forming one great
community, and I consider the people of the different States as form-
ing communities again on a lesser scale. From this great division of
the people into distinct communities it will be found necessary that
different proportions of legislative powers should be given to the
governments, according to the nature, number and magnitude of their
objects.
Unless the people are considered in these two views, we shall
never be able to understand the principle on which this system was
constructed. I view the States as made for the people as well as by
them, and not the people as made for the States. The people, there-
fore, have a right, whilst enjoying the undeniable powers of society,
to form either a general government, or state governments, in what
manner they please; or to accommodate them to one another, and by
this means preserve them all. This, I say, is the inherent and unalien-
able right of the people, and as an illustration of it, I beg to read a
few words from the Declaration of Independence ....
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . 1..."-25
The dual nature of the people, and hence of their representatives, was clearly
described by Senator Pugh of Ohio during the Trumbull debate:
I agree that no State can dispense with, or subtract from, the
requisites prescribed in the Federal Constitution; but I can see no
pretense for asserting that the States may not superadd any qualifica-
tion which is consistent with those requisites. A Senator is an officer
of the Federal Government; he is, also, an officer of his own State.
He is elected to represent the people of the State, in an aggregate and
organized capacity, as one of the sovereign parties to our Federal
compact.... Whilst the Federal Constitution might prescribe certain
requisites, therefore, in order to secure the interests of the Federal
Government, the rights of the citizens of all the States, and the wel-
fare of the whole Union; whilst it might well do this, and bind each
State to an observance of such requisites, no reason can be assigned
why the people of a State-whose peculiar representative and officer
in equal degree their Senator is-might not prescribe other qualifica-
tions, in addition, for the purpose of protecting their separate inter-
ests, rights, and welfare.'26
125. James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, 4 Dec. 1787, reprinted in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUION 62 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987) (added by Wilson).
126. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 550 (1856). Justice Thomas made the identical
argument in his Term Limits dissent: "[Tlhe fact that the Constitution specifies certain qualifica-
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Senator Foot rejected Pugh's characterization, arguing that "the Senate of the
United States is the creation and its members the creatures of the Federal
Constitution," and that
the office of Senator or Representative in Congress is a United States
office, and not a State office; that it is created by the United States
Constitution, and not by the State constitution; that all its functions
are derived from the Federal Constitution, and not from the constitu-
tion or any original right of the State.'27
Senator Pugh, like James Wilson before him, makes the stronger argument.
Thus, although Senator Foot and Representatives Key and Quincy were correct
in asserting that the House of Representatives has a national character, they
were wrong in ignoring the fact that it also has a confederal character in
which the states, as states, are constitutionally guaranteed a role. As Represen-
tative Charles Snodgrass of Tennessee stated during the Roberts debate:
I take the position that [a member of the House of Representatives] is
a State officer, elected by the people of his State to represent them in
Congress, which body is composed of the sum total of the number
elected in all the States. It is true that the effects of such representa-
tion may become national in character, but nevertheless the choice of
office is locally controlled. His resignation is made to the governor,
and his place can not be filled except at the pleasure of the State
authorities.'28
The arguments about the partly national character of the Congress do not,
therefore, provide an adequate rationale for reading the Qualifications Clauses
exclusively so as to prohibit the states from imposing other qualifications
suitable to protecting the partly confederal character of Congress.
C. The Object of the Qualifications Clauses
The proponents of an exclusive reading also argued that the object, or
purpose, of the Qualifications Clauses was to protect the people's right to vote
for whomever they chose, subject only to a very few fundamental limitations.
Representative Findley clearly articulated this position during the McCreery
debate: "It is the natural right of all men to choose whom they please, without
regard to age, residence, &c., to represent and advocate their interests," and
the imposition of qualifications for office is an infringement of that right.
2 9
In stating the position, Findley echoed the statements by a number of the
participants in the state conventions which ratified the Constitution, 30 state-
tions that the Framers deemed necessary to protect the competence of the National Legislature
does not imply that it strips the people of the individual States of the power to protect their own
interests by adding other requirements for their own representatives." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1886-87 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
127. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 579-80 (1856).
128. 33 CONG. REC. 1126 (1899).
129. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 873 (1807).
130. See id. at 872-77.
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ments which the Supreme Court cited in both Powell v. McCormack3' and
Term Limits.'32 Alexander Hamilton, for example, argued during the New
York ratifying convention that "the true principle of a republic is, that the peo-
ple should choose whom they please to govern them. Representation is imper-
fect in proportion as the current of popular favor is checked. This great source
of free government, popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most
unbounded liberty allowed."'33 Similarly, Robert Livingston argued during
the Virginia ratifying convention that "[tihe people are the best judges who
ought to represent them. To dictate and control them, to tell them whom they
shall not elect, is to abridge their natural rights." '34
The position articulated by Findley and several of the founders may prove
too much for the present inquiry, however, for under such a rationale even the
minimal qualifications listed in the Constitution would be an infringement on
the natural rights of the people. The question then, is not whether the right of
suffrage can be infringed, but by whom. Findley attempted an answer:
[I]t is necessary for the protection of society that this right be
abridged, but it ought to be no further abridged than is absolutely
necessary for the safety of the society, and of this the society itself
are the only competent and authoritative judges; and in the United
States the society have decided on this principle by their general and
ratifying conventions, and they have delegated no authority even to
Congress, much less to States, to alter or add to or diminish these
qualifications. "'
Findley's response fails to take account of the parallel societies-state and
national-that operate in the American regime. It therefore provides no re-
sponse to the position articulated by Senator Pugh above, that the people in
their individual state capacities as well as the people in their national capacity
have interests, the protection of which might require the infringement of "the
natural right of all men to choose whom they please" to represent them.'36
As Findley himself recognized: "The right of prescribing new or additional
qualifications of members of Congress, is not a question between the Federal
and State Governments; it rests between the State Legislature and the peo-
ple."'37 Findley appears to have been speaking only of the people in their
national capacity, but once the people are also recognized in their state capaci-
ties, Findley's analysis would seem to require that those lesser societies could
also seek to protect their societal interests by imposing additional qualifica-
tions. Indeed, Representative Johnson suggested during the McCreery debate
that the problem with the Maryland provision was that it was enacted by the
131. See 395 U.S. 486, 532-41 (1969).
132. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1849-51, 1856-71 (1995).
133. Powell, 395 U.S. at 540-41 (citing 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 93, at 257); see also
Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1851.
134. Powell, 395 U.S. at 541 (citing 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 93, at 292-93); see also
Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1851.
135. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 873-74 (1807).
136. See supra text accompanying note 126.
137. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 874 (1807).
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state legislature, not by the state people.'38 After repeating Findley's natural
rights argument, he stated: "Would any power less than a convention of the
State of Maryland assume the right of adding a disqualification?"'
3 9
There is a possible answer to Findley's conundrum, one suggested by
Senators Seward and Foot during the Trumbull debate: Article VI of the Con-
stitution provides that the Constitution "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."'' " Thus, if the Qualifications Clauses insure the right of individual
citizens to vote for anyone who is constitutionally qualified, additional qualifi-
cations imposed by a state legislature or by the people would be an in-
fringement of that constitutionally protected right, and hence must give way to
the higher authority. To the extent that the sovereignty of a state's people is
also recognized and protected by the national Constitution, however, as de-
scribed above,'4 ' the people's right to prescribe certain limitations on them-
selves in the choosing of representatives rests on the same constitutional plane
as the individual's right to choose whom he will. The Supremacy Clause does
not tilt the scale toward one side or the other when both rights are constitu-
tionally recognized. 42
Nor is Findley's purpose the only possible purpose of the Qualifications
Clauses. Given the history of representation under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, it is at least plausible that the clauses were intended merely to prevent
states from sending underage representatives, or those just recently naturalized.
As Representative John Randolph stated during the McCreery debate:
[Sbo far from fixing the qualifications of members of [the] House, the
constitution merely enumerated a few disqualifications within which
the States were left to act. It said to the States, you have been in the
habit of electing young men barely of age; you shall send us none but
such as are five and twenty: some of you have elected persons just
naturalized; you shall not elect any to this House who have not been
seven years citizens of the United States. Sometimes mere sojourners
and transient persons have been clothed with legislative authority; you
shall elect none whom your laws do not consider as inhabitants. Thus
guarding against too great laxity in the State regulations, by general
and negative provisions, leaving them, however, within the limits of
138. See id. at 896-98.
139. Id. at 897. Representative Rowan also asked, "[hiad the Legislature of the State of Mary-
land the power of thus contracting the choice of the people?" Id. at 892. Elsewhere, however, he
clearly implied that not even the people of the state could impose qualifications in addition to
those enumerated by the people of the whole. See id. at 896-98.
140. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 343, 579 (1856) (statements of Sen. Seward and
Sen. Foot, respectively) (referring to U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
141. See supra text accompanying note 119-22.
142. The Term Limits majority also suggested at one point that the clauses embody "an egali-
tarian ideal-that election to the National Legislature should be open to all people of merit .... "
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1862 (1995). As Justice Thomas pointed out,
"the majority apparently would read the Qualifications Clauses to create a personal right to be a
candidate for Congress," id. at 1891 (Thomas, J., dissenting), although the majority denied that its
statement had such implications. Id. at 1851 n. 11.
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those restrictions, to act for themselves; to consult the genius, habits,
and, if you will, the prejudices of their people.'43
Representative Robert Miers of Indiana made a similar argument during the
Roberts debate, although he focused more on the citizenship qualification:
We all know that in England the people had been in the habit of
sending to their lawmaking power young men, minors who were not
matured, minors who were not capable of comprehending the Gov-
ernment and legislating for its best interests. They had not only been
doing that, but nonresidents, alien citizens, had been sent to Parlia-
ment for the purpose of making laws. I believe, and take it not only
from my judgment, but from the reasonings on that occasion and
from the debates, that the real purpose of the founders in enacting the
Constitution was to make a concise statement and guard against the
possibility of foreigners controlling the Republic. I believe the reason
of that fixed limit upon citizenship was in order that aliens and non-
residents might be shut out from the great American House of Con-
gress for a period of time until they should become Americanized and
catch the spirit of the Republic.'"
Thus, in this view, the Qualifications Clauses were intended to protect certain
national interests against state folly; they said nothing about the ability of the
states to impose additional qualifications to protect their own interests.
At first glance, it is hard to reconcile Randolph's statement of purpose
and his corollary view that the states could impose additional qualifications
with the passages from the ratifying conventions cited above.' 5 Furthermore,
three important passages from the Federalist papers lend even more credence
to the Findley claim that the purpose of the Qualifications Clauses was to
protect the natural right of the people to choose whomever they wished. In
Federalist 52, Madison wrote:
Under [the] reasonable limitations [of age, citizenship, and residency],
the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of
every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old,
and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profes-
sion of religious faith."4
Similarly, in Federalist 57, Madison wrote:
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen
whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of
his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or
of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint
the inclination of the people.'47
143. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 883-84 (1807).
144. 33 CONG. REC. 1138 (1899).
145. See supra text accompanying note 133-34.
146. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
147. Id. No. 57, at 351.
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Finally, Hamilton wrote in Federalist 60:
The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the prefer-
ence apprehended but by prescribing qualifications of property either
for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the
power to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority
would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the plac-
es, and the manner of elections. The qualifications of the persons who
may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occa-
sions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable
by the legislature."
These passages are clearly sweeping, and strongly suggest, standing alone, that
the Qualifications Clauses set forth an exclusive list of qualifications. Before
we can be certain of such a conclusion, however, we must place the passages
in context, remembering that Madison and Hamilton were writing during a
particular political controversy and responding to particular concerns raised by
the "Anti-Federalist" opponents of the national constitution.'49
Foremost among the concerns of the Anti-Federalists was that the national
government was given too much power under the proposed constitution.5
Anti-Federalists were concerned, for example, that the preemptive regulatory
power given to Congress over the times, places, and manner of elections 5'
would enable it to impose a property qualification and thereby create an oli-
garchic national government. Hamilton's statement in Federalist 60 is a direct
response to this concern. Placed in this context, Hamilton's statement is mere-
ly a rebuttal to the charge that Congress could impose a property (or other)
qualification, not that the states were similarly limited. When combined with
the fact that the states do not derive their power from the U.S. Constitution, it
is at least plausible that the sweeping last sentence of the passage, describing
the Constitutional qualifications as "fixed," meant only that Congress could
not add qualifications because the Time, Place and Manner Clause conferred
upon it no such authority, not that the Qualifications Clauses themselves set
forth an exclusive list of qualifications.
Anti-Federalists also argued that the terms of office for Representatives
(two years) and especially Senators (six years) were too long, since under the
Articles of Confederation, members of the Continental Congress were elected
annually, and were subject to recall by their states.'52 The following is from
the minority report of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention:
148. Id. No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton).
149. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has long recognized that "general expressions, in
every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used."
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821).
150. J.R. Pole, Introduction to THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION FOR AND AGAINST 17 (J.R.
Pole ed., 1987).
151. "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by
Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
152. ART. OF CONFED. art. V, reprinted in I THORPE, supra note 39, at 11.
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The permanency of the appointments of senators and representatives,
and the controul the congress have over their election, will place
them independent of the sentiments and resentment of the people, and
the administration having a greater interest in the government than in
the community, there will be no consideration to restrain them from
oppression and tyranny.'53
Anti-Federalists also objected to the fact that the new Constitution did not
mandate rotation in office:
[11n a government consisting of but a few members, elected for long
periods, and far removed from the observation of the people, but few
changes in the ordinary course of elections take place among the
members; they become in some measure a fixed body, and often inat-
tentive to the public good, callous, selfish, and the fountain of corrup-
tion. To prevent these evils, and to force a principle of pure anima-
tion into the federal government .... and to produce attention, activi-
ty, and a diffusion of knowledge in the community, we ought to
establish among others the principle of rotation. Even good men in
office, in time, imperceptibly lose sight of the people, and gradually
fall into measures prejudicial to them. 5'
Madison responded to both of these concerns. In Federalist 52, after rec-
ognizing that it was "essential to liberty that the government in general should
have a common interest with the people" and that it was "particularly essen-
tial" that the House of Representatives "should have an immediate dependence
on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people,"'' 51 Madison argued that bien-
nial elections were sufficient to insure the necessary commonality of interest
between representatives and the people. Similarly, in Federalist 57, Madison
spoke of the importance of frequent elections:
[T]he House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the
members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people.
Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their
elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be com-
153. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention in Pennsylvania
to Their Constituents, 18 Dec. 1787, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST § 11, at 48-
50 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
154. Letter from a Federal Farmer, Jan. 10, 1788 (attributed to Richard Henry Lee), reprinted
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 153, § 8, at 286, 290-91. The Term Limits
majority made much of the fact that supporters of the Constitution never countered such argu-
ments by responding that the states could individually impose a rotation requirement on their
members of Congress. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1859-60 (1995). "If
the participants in the debate had believed that the States retained the authority to impose term
limits, it is inconceivable that the Federalists would not have made this obvious response to the
arguments of the pro-rotation forces." Id. at 1860. It is at least as inconceivable, however, that the
opponents of the Constitution would not have raised the issue if a restriction on state power was
understood. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent, "The recorded ratification debates also
contain no affirmative statement that the States cannot supplement the constitutional qualifica-
tions .... If the Federal Constitution had been understood to deprive the States of this significant
power, one might well have expected its opponents to seize on this point in arguing against ratifi-
cation." Id. at 1901 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
155. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
pelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when
their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to
the level from which they were raised; there forever to remain unless
a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a
renewal of it. 56
It was also in response to such concerns of the Anti-Federalists that Madi-
son argued in Federalist 51 that "[a] dependence on the people is, no doubt,
the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the
necessity of auxiliary precautions."' 57 The principal auxiliary precaution
Madison described was the system of checks and balances contained in the
Constitution. Significantly, though, Madison thought that was not enough:
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power
of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority
necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to
divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by
different modes of election and different principles of action, as little
connected with each other as the nature of their common functions
and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even
be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still fur-
ther precautions.5 '
It was in this context of answering Anti-Federalist charges against the
"oligarchic[ ]" features of the new government'59 that Madison argued that
under the reasonable limitations of the Qualifications Clauses, the door of
Congress was "open to merit of every description'"' and that "[n]o qualifi-
cation of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted
to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people."'' It was
in the context of demonstrating the numerous ways in which the national
government would remain subject to the people's will that Madison even
addressed the Qualifications Clauses. But in such a context, Madison's broad
language must be understood as applicable to the national government only;
the issue of state power was not at issue.'62
Moreover, Madison stated that "[iut may even be necessary to guard
against dangerous encroachments [by the Congress] by still further precau-
tions."'6 3 What was to be the source of such further precautions? Given the
important role Congress plays in the Constitutional amendment process, it is
hard to envision the amendment process as a ready mechanism.6" The states
156. Id. No. 57, at 352.
157. Id. No. 51, at 322.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. See id. No. 57, at 350.
160. Id. No. 52, at 326.
161. Id. No. 57 at 351.
162. As Justice Thomas argued in his Term Limits dissent, "[o]ne should not lightly assume
that Madison and his colleagues, who were attempting to win support at the state level for the new
Constitution, were proclaiming the inability of the people of the States or their state legislatures to
prescribe any eligibility requirements for their own Representatives or Senators." U.S. Term Lim-
its, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1892 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
163. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
164. Article V, of course, provides that Congress may propose amendments whenever two
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are a much more likely source for such precautions and if, in the judgment or
inclination of the people of a state, additional precautions become neces-
sary, 6*5 the context in which Madison was writing would suggest that the
constitution he was defending provided no barrier. Reading the Qualifications
Clauses as setting a minimal limitation on state power rather than setting forth
an exclusive list of qualifications is in accord with such concerns. As Justice
Thomas wrote in his Term Limits dissent: "[w]hen the people of a State them-
selves decide to restrict the field of candidates whom they are willing to send
to Washington as their representatives, they simply have not violated the prin-
ciple that 'the people should choose whom they please to govern them.""'
D. An Unrepublican Parade of Horribles
The proponents of the exclusive interpretation also argued that it was an
important principle of republican government that the qualifications of elected
officials should be fixed,'67 and that if the states were free to impose addi-
tional qualifications, true republican government would be at an end. During
the McCreery debate, Representative Sturges rattled off the following qual-
ifications that might be imposed if the principle of state power over the sub-
ject were established:
Will gentlemen attend to the consequences of the doctrine they
contend for against the acceptance of the [Election Committee's]
report? If the States had a right to superadd, why might they not say,
by law, that the candidate should have an income of $10,000 per
year? Why not, if they should think it expedient, apportion the num-
ber of Representatives to which they are entitled, among the different
professions of the community? Why not say that a certain number
should be physicians, a certain number lawyers, and a certain number
clergymen? Why not say that the candidate should be an inhabitant of
the particular State any number of years he pleases-say twelve, or
any other number-although, by the Constitution, a residence of
thirds of both Houses deem it necessary. U.S. CONST. art. V. Even the alternate route by which a
convention can propose amendments requires that Congress call the convention after application
by two thirds of the state legislatures. Id.
165. Such as the district residency requirement at issue in McCreery. See supra part I.A.; see
also infra part 1l.D.
166. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1891 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 93, at 257 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton at the
New York convention)).
167. See, e.g., Representative Smilie during the McCreery debate: "[Tihere was a principle in
a Republican Government of as much importance as any other, as respected the safety of the Gov-
ernment, that the qualifications of the people elected should be firm, steady, and unalterable." 17
ANNALS OF CONG. 887 (1807). James Madison had argued that the qualifications of both the
electors and the elected should be, and were, fixed by the national constitution. The qualifications
of the electors were clearly not "fixed" by the national constitution, however, but were tied to
whatever qualifications the several states imposed upon their own electors. Thus, the issue is not
whether qualifications should be fixed, but whether they could be fixed in state constitutions as
well as the national constitution. Moreover, because of the different nature of the authority granted
to at least some of the state governments-all powers were given except those specifically re-
served, whereas only specifically granted powers were given to the national govemment--quali-
fications might also be "fixed" by state legislatures and still conform to Madison's analysis.
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seven years within the United States is sufficient? Why not say he
should profess certain political principles? Why not that he should
possess certain moral qualifications? Or, to come more nearly to the
particular case now under consideration, if they had a right to restrict
the residence to a particular town in the district, why not to a par-
ticular street in that town, or even to a particular house? Were gentle-
men prepared to admit these consequences?'
Representative Rowan echoed Sturges's concerns and suggested that such
qualifications would run afoul of the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution. 69
In so doing, he suggested an answer to his own concerns. Some qualifications,
such as owning a large landed estate, would undermine republicanism and
verge toward aristocracy, and thus might be checked by Congress as necessary
and proper to effect the guarantee of Article IV, Section 4.170 Other
qualifications, however, such as residency within the district, were representa-
tion enhancing and thus were compatible with the Guarantee Clause. As John
Randolph stated, "residence within the body of the county or district [is] of the
very essence of representation.
The Fourteenth Amendment, and by it the incorporation of the First
Amendment as applicable to the states, have afforded modem courts additional
tools with which to check the imposition of unrepublican qualifications, but
those opposed to an exclusive interpretation of the Qualifications Clauses had
an answer to such concerns even prior to the Fourteenth Amendment. As John
Randolph argued during the McCreery debate:
The most violent suppositions were pressed into service to show that
the States cannot be trusted. He might as well suppose that the States
168. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 878 (1807) (Rep. Sturges); see also 15 CONG. REC. 3297, 3300-01
(1884) (Representatives Elliott and Peters discussing fixed qualifications for members of Congress
during the Peters debate).
169. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 892-93 (1807) (Rep. Rowan). "The United States shall guarantee
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government ...." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
170. The Supreme Court stated in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42-43 (1849), that
some issues arising under the Guarantee Clause are political questions not justiciable by the
courts, thus depriving the clause of much of its power. See also Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 149-50 (1912) (holding that whether a state ceased to be republican in
form because it adopted initiative and referendum procedures was a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion). Enforcement of the clause by Congress remained a possibility because, as the Luther Court
implied, Congress might refuse admission to members from states that imposed unrepublican
qualifications. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42.
171. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 885 (1807). Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that
"no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the
United States," might also have provided a limitation on the states. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
Senator Foot argued during the Trumbull debate, however, that if a state could add disqualifica-
tions on judges, "it has equal power to impose the same disability upon those professing the Ro-
man Catholic faith, or the Jewish faith, or the Calvinistic faith," CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st
Sess. 580 (1856), despite the express ban on religious qualifications contained in Article VI. The
two kinds of disqualifications were indistinguishable, according to Foot, because "the State has
just as much power to impose tests of qualification for office under the United States, which are
expressly prohibited by the Federal Constitution, and quite as much power to take away or abro-
gate those tests of qualification which it expressly prescribes, as it has to superadd other tests
which are clearly excluded by implication." Id. Senator Pugh countered by stating it was sufficient
to say that religious tests were expressly prohibited. Id. at 583.
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might require five millions of acres of land as a qualification neces-
sary to entitle a man to vote; and then most of the States would be
wholly unrepresented; indeed none but Yazoo men could vote.'
There would be an end of the Government. No quorum of that House
would ever assemble. Such monstrous cases might amuse, but could
never convince. The Constitution had confided to the States, State
interests. If they were not safe there let them adopt this report, do
away all State rights, and then we should have that consolidated
government which the gentleman from Kentucky so much admired,
but which he from his very soul detested and abhorred.'73
Senator Pugh made a similar observation during the Trumbull debate: "Why
should we fear that the people of the States, either through their conventions
or through their Legislatures, will abuse this power more than we should abuse
it? Has all wisdom departed from the people?"
74
While such arguments may carry little weight in the twentieth century,
when most Americans tend to view the national government as the defender of
individual rights against unrepublican and discriminatory state practices, the
opposite was true in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, when the
states were seen as a bulwark against encroachments on liberty by the central
government. '
E. The Constitution Affords the States No Power to Add Qualifications
The final argument made by the proponents of exclusive interpretation
was that the Constitution nowhere gives the states power to impose additional
qualifications for members of Congress. Essentially, this argument is a deriva-
tive of the argument made earlier; because Congress is a creation of the na-
tional Constitution, the states have no power over congressional elections
except that which the same Constitution gives them. The exponents of this
argument view the Time, Place and Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4, as
the sole grant of power to the states over the subject of congressional elec-
tions,'76 and since the power to add qualifications for members of Congress
is not a regulation of time, place, or manner, it is not included within the
clause.'77 As Representative Quincy remarked during the McCreery debate,
172. The Term Limits majority made a similar argument. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1858 (1995) ("[U]nder the dissent's approach, the States could achieve
exactly the same result [as not holding elections] by simply setting qualifications for federal office
sufficiently high that no one could meet those qualifications."). Randolph's answer to his 1807
opponents is equally applicable to the Term Limits majority.
173. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 944 (1807).
174. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 583 (1856).
175. Even a property qualification, which immediately suggests oligarchic motives to the
twentieth century observer, was seen as enhancing representation in the largely agrarian society of
the eighteenth century by requiring that the representative have a stake in the community he was
to represent.
176. Or one of two powers granted to the states, the other being the indirect power under
Article I, Section 2, Clause I to set the qualifications for electors. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
177. The Term Limits majority correctly pointed out that if the states had power to impose
qualifications under this clause, "Congress itself would have the power to 'make or alter' [qualifi-
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"[i]t must be remembered, that if the power of fixing qualifications be not
given in this clause, it was given nowhere; there was no delegation of it to the
people, or to the States."'
7 8
There are two problems with Quincy's argument: first, the states do not
derive their powers from the national Constitution, but from the people of the
several states via the several state constitutions. The national Constitution acts
rather by way of prohibition on state powers, and the states are presumed to
have powers not delegated to the national government nor prohibited to them,
as the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution makes clear." 9 As Samuel
Wood argued during the Peters debate:
The Federal Convention was not delegating rights or powers to the
States, as the majority report seems to assume, or to the people; it
was the States in convention delegating powers to the General Gov-
ernment, and imposing certain restrictions upon the States, restrictions
upon the powers already possessed by the States. And it should not
be forgotten that the States surrendered no right not expressly named,
and they gave us no power not specifically delegated in the Constitu-
tion of the United States. Among the powers possessed by the States
before the Federal Constitution was formed was that of prescribing
the qualifications of their agents or representatives in Congress. The
right to fix other qualifications, in addition to those enumerated in the
Constitution, was retained by the States along with that mass of pow-
ers not specifically delegated.8
In response to this problem, Representative Elliott argued:
From whence do the States derive power to prescribe qualifica-
tions for members of Congress? The power is not delegated to them
by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. The office
is essentially a Federal one, and it is clear to me that unless some
section of the Constitution of the United States can be pointed out
which gives the States the power to prescribe qualifications for Rep-
resentatives in the Congress of the National Government no such
power exists."'
cations]." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1869 (1995). Attributing such a
result to the Framers would be "unfathomable," since, as the Term Limits majority and the Powell
Court before it correctly realized, the Framers clearly intended that Congress should not have the
power to control the qualifications of its own members. Id. at 1852; Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 540 (1969).
178. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 908 (1807); see also id. at 912 (statement of Rep. Key) ("I lay it
down as a political truth, that the States, in their sovereign capacities, have no power, right, or
authority to interfere with the elections of Representatives to Congress, except so far as the Con-
stitution of the United States [Art. I, § 4.] gives them special power so to do.").
179. U.S. CONST. amend X; see also infra part III.D.
180. 15 CONG. REC. app. at 76 (1884).
181. 15 CONG. REC. 3297 (1884); see also CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 467 (1856)
(statement of Sen. Trumbull) ("Where did the Legislature of Illinois get the power to elect whom-
soever it pleased to the Senate? ... The power to elect a Senator is not inherent in a State; it is
derivative from the Constitution of the United States.").
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Elliott's response merely collapses into the question about the nature of the
national legislature discussed above,'82 however, and does not address the
dual nature of representatives in Congress. Moreover, it does not respond to
the second half of Wood's argument, that the states had prescribed qualifica-
tions for their representatives to the Continental Congress prior to the Federal
Convention.
The second problem with Quincy's argument is that it turns on a reading
of Article I, Section 4 as a grant of power to the states,' but even a cursory
examination of the text of the clause does not readily support such a reading.
Article I, Section 4 provides: "[tihe Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof, but the Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of chusing Senators."'8 14 The
states legislatures shall prescribe such regulations, but Congress may make or
alter them. The clause is not a grant of power to the states, but a mandate to
them, with a preemptive power given to Congress.'85 As John Randolph ar-
gued during the McCreery debate:
The gentleman had undertaken to find a denial of the power of a
State to superadd qualifications to a Representative, in a grant of
power to the States "to regulate the time, place, and manner of hold-
ing elections," and had contended, with great propriety, that in every
grant of [power,] the powers not enumerated, and not necessary to
carry the enumerated powers into effect, were denied. Mr. R. said
that, at the first blush, the clause in question might appear to contain
a grant of power to the States, but look at it for a moment with a
steady eye and its complexion varied. It was in fact a grant of power
to Congress, with a mere permission.to the States to exercise that
power until Congress should choose to take it out of their hands. The
Government could not have been called into existence, without the in-
tervention of this power, and as it must be lodged somewhere, the
States were permitted to exercise it at the sufferance of Congress.
This clause, then, being a grant of powers to Congress and not to the
States contained a denial to Congress, and not to the States, of the
powers not enumerated in it.8 6
The importance of this distinction is that, if valid, it undermines the argument
that the Constitution has comprehensively regulated congressional elections,
and thus that the states have only that power over the subject which the
182. See supra part ll.B.
183. The Term Limits majority also read the Time, Place and Manner Clause as a grant of
authority to the states. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1869 (1995)
("The Framers intended the Elections clause to grant States authority to create procedural regula-
tions .... ") (emphasis added); id. at 1873 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[The clause) grants States
certain powers over the times, places, and manner of federal elections .. ) (emphasis added).
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
185. Justice Thomas recognized this distinction in his Term Limits dissent: "Contrary to the
majority's assumption .... this Clause does not delegate any authority to the States. Instead, it
simply imposes a duty upon them." Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1883 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 942 (1807) (emphasis added).
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Constitution gives them. The state legislatures would thus have a power to
regulate the time, place, and manner of elections that exists outside of the
Constitution, subject to the preemptive power given by the Constitution to
Congress. Similarly, Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 would recognize that the
people of the several states have a power to choose their own representatives
to Congress that exists prior to the Constitution; that same clause would then
merely mandate that they do so "every second Year" by electors having the
same qualifications as "Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature."' 8 7 Under such an interpretation, the Qualifications Clauses
would serve merely to provide an additional restriction on the recognized
power of the people of the several states; they cannot send someone who has
not attained the age of twenty-five, or been seven years a citizen, or who was
not at the time of his election an inhabitant of the state.
The problem with such an interpretation is that it is also possible that the
several elections clauses, taken together, comprehensively regulate the election
of members of Congress, thus implying that the states are prohibited from
exercising any preexisting power over the subject except that which is specifi-
cally granted. The crucial issue, then, is not whether the Constitution grants
the people of the several states 8 ' the power to impose qualifications,'89 but
whether the several elections clauses should be read to imply a prohibition on
their power. From what has been argued thus far, the clauses themselves do
not dispositively settle the question. We turn, therefore, to the arguments for
interpreting the Qualifications Clauses as a list of minimum qualifications.
187. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
188. I say "people of the several states" in order to take account of the legitimate concern
raised by Representative Findley during the McCreery debate. He observed:
[Tihe power of prescribing additional qualifications has not by the people in their con-
ventions been granted to Congress, nor does Congress claim or pretend to exercise it.
They have not, either by the federal ratifying conventions or by the State constitutions,
vested that power in the State Legislatures. Whence then did the State Legislatures de-
rive this right of making supplements to the qualifications prescribed by the Federal
Constitution? Not from the people, in any known manner.
17 ANNALS OF CONG. 876 (1807) (emphasis added). By including the language about state consti-
tutions, Findley implicitly recognized that the people of a state might grant such a power to their
state legislature. When one considers, however, that many of the state legislatures are given by
their state constitutions a general grant of legislative power subject only to certain prohibitions,
rather than a limited grant of power, such as was given to Congress, the distinction between the
state and the people of the state becomes less important.
189. Both sides of the debate generally agreed that setting qualifications was not a time,
place, or manner regulation, and the fact that qualifications were listed in a separate clause strong-
ly supports this conclusion, despite the opinion by Justice Black in Oregon v. Mitchell to the
contrary. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1972). The Illinois provision disqualifying
judges that was at issue in the Trumbull case, however, also specified that "[a]ll votes for [judges
or justices], for any elective office, (except that of judge of the supreme or circuit court,) given by
the General Assembly or the people, shall be void." ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, § 10, reprinted
in 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 999. As Senator Pugh argued, the provision was thus not simply a
disqualification, but a manner of election regulation as well, because it specified the manner in
which the disqualification was to be enforced. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 550 (1856).
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III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR INTERPRETING THE QUALIFICATIONS CLAUSES AS
A LIST OF MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS
A. Some Additional Qualifications Are Compatible with the Constitutional
Qualifications
The first argument made by defenders of the states' right to impose addi-
tional qualifications was that some qualifications, such as the district residency
requirement at issue in McCreery, were compatible with the Qualifications
Clauses of the Constitution, and hence were permissible. Thus, Representative
Sawyer argued:
An inclusion [in the Constitution] of a condition of residency in a
State was not an exclusion of a residency in a district; and a State, by
annexing the latter condition to the former, did not in any respect
affect the full operation of that clause of the Constitution, according
to its sense, expressed or implied. There was no necessity, under the
most liberal construction of this article, to suppose that a residency in
a State should supersede the necessity of a residency in a district. So
far from the views which the Framers of the Constitution had being
thwarted by a construction of the kind he contended for, it would be
the means of more completely carrying them into effect, unless it
could be supposed that a person's being better qualified than the
Constitution required should disqualify him altogether; for undoubted-
ly the surest, and in fact the only way of becoming a resident of a
State, was to become a resident of a district-for every State was
composed of districts.'
The district residency requirement at issue in McCreery was an addition to the
residency requirement contained in the Constitution, and it might be argued in
response to Sawyer that at least in the three fields of age, citizenship, and
residency specified in the Constitution, the states could not alter the qualifica-
tions because the constitutional clause had occupied the field. Thus, as Senator
Foot later argued in the Trumbull case, a state could not require that a Senator
be forty years old instead of thirty, or twenty-one years a citizen instead of
nine, despite the fact that "[tihese tests of qualification are not expressly pro-
hibited in the Federal Constitution; nor are they in direct conflict or contraven-
tion of those expressly prescribed in that instrument.""'
The question whether stricter qualifications of the same type as those
specified in the Constitution are compatible with the Constitution cannot be
answered, of course, without assessing the nature of the Qualifications Clauses
themselves. If state inhabitancy was meant to be the exclusive residency re-
quirement, then the additional requirement of district residency would be in-
compatible with the constitutional requirement; but if state residency at a mini-
mum was intended, the additional qualification of district residency is perfectly
190. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 880 (1807).
191. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 580 (1856).
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compatible with the constitutional requirement.'92 While there is some evi-
dence to suggest that the Framers were concerned with representatives having
a certain set of minimum qualifications,'93 calling the additional qualifica-
tions compatible merely begs the question of the nature of the Qualifications
Clauses themselves.
The analysis is slightly different with respect to additional qualifications
that do not deal with age, citizenship, or residency, but the question about
their compatibility is the same. One might argue that because the Constitution
says nothing about property qualifications, or about ineligibility for state offi-
cers, a state's imposition of such qualifications is not in conflict with the age,
citizenship, or inhabitancy requirements of the Qualifications Clauses. Senator
Pugh, during the Trumbull debate, conceded that "no State can dispense with,
or subtract from, the requisites prescribed in the Federal Constitution," but he
saw "no pretense for asserting that the States may not superadd any qualifica-
tion which is consistent with those requirements," no reason why a state
"might not prescribe other qualifications, in addition, for the purpose of pro-
tecting their separate interests, rights, and welfare."'94
Again, though, calling a property qualification or the judicial ineligibility
provision at issue in the Trumbull case compatible with the Qualifications
Clauses begs the question about the nature of those clauses. They are compati-
ble if the clauses were intended to occupy the qualifications field with respect
only to age, citizenship, and residency requirements, but incompatible if the
clauses were intended to occupy the entire qualifications field. As Senator
Pugh recognized, "such additional requisites must not only be consistent with
those specified in the Constitution of the United States, but with the whole
spirit and tenor of that instrument."'95 Thus, the essential inquiry is not com-
patibility, but the nature and object of both the Qualifications Clauses and the
entire Constitution of which they are a part.
B. Negative Phrasing of the Qualifications Clauses
Several of the proponents of state power argued that because the Qualifi-
cations Clauses were phrased negatively, the Framers intended them to set
forth minimum, not exclusive, qualifications. John Randolph framed the argu-
ment during the McCreery debate as follows:
Mark the distinctions between the first and second paragraphs [of
Article I, Section 2]. The first is affirmative and positive. "They shall
have the qualifications necessary to the electors of the most numerous
branch of the State Legislature." The second merely negative. "No
person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the age
of twenty-five years," &c. No man could be a member without these
requisites; but it did not follow that he who had them was entitled to
192. The same inquiry is necessary for the age and citizenship qualifications as well.
193. See supra text accompanying note 146.
194. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 550 (1856).
195. Id.
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set at naught such other requisites as the several States might think
proper to demand. If the Constitution had meant (as was contended)
to have settled the qualification of members, its words would have
naturally ran thus: "Every person who has attained the age of twenty-
five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and
who shall, when elected, be an inhabitant of the State from which he
shall be chosen, shall be eligible to a seat in the House of Represen-
tatives." But so far from fixing the qualifications of members of that
House, the Constitution merely enumerated a few disqualifications
within which the States were left to act.
96
Representative Bibb echoed Randolph's argument, and pointed out that "[t]he
language was not such, according to legal construction, as to induce the House
to say that the State authorities might not require other qualifications."' 97
More importantly, as has already been described,'98 John Randolph argued
that the Framers were concerned lest the states send unqualified representa-
tives to Congress:
[The Constitution] said to the States, you have been in the habit of
electing young men barely of age; you shall send us none but such as
are five and twenty: some of you have elected persons just natural-
ized; you shall not elect any to this House who have not been seven
years citizens of the United States. Sometimes mere sojourners and
transient persons have been clothed with legislative authority; you
shall elect none whom your laws do not consider as inhabitants. Thus
guarding against too great laxity in the State regulations, by general
and negative provisions, leaving them, however, within the limits of
those restrictions, to act for themselves; to consult the genius, habits,
and, if you will, the prejudices of their people.'"
Reading the clauses as setting forth only minimum qualifications addresses
those concerns.
There are two criticisms of the negative phrasing argument. The first is
that, by the same reasoning, states could add qualifications to the office of
President, since the clause describing presidential qualifications is also phrased
196. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 883 (1807) (emphasis in original).
197. Id. at 890. Bibb was no doubt referring to the expressio unius principle of interpretation
which, in its common usage, applied to positively-phrased recitations, not negatively-phrased ones.
See supra part II.A.; see also 33 CONG. REc. 39 (1899) (statement of Rep. Taylor) ("the language
providing for the age, and so on, is negative in its character"); 15 CONG. REC. app. at 75 (1884)
(statement of Rep. Wood) ("[The clause] is not a grant of power. It does not attempt to prescribe
the qualifications of members of Congress. These provisions are negative and limitations on the
States."); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 549 (1856) (statement of Sen. Pugh) ("Its language
is that of exclusion, and not of qualification.").
198. See supra text accompanying note 143.
199. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 883-84 (1807).
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in negative terms.2"' As Representative Key pointed out during the McCreery
debate:
The expressions used in [Article II] are in negative terms, in the same
manner as those used with respect to qualifications of Representa-
tives; and does any reasonable man, and does any friend of the Con-
stitution, say that the States can superinduce or add any other qualifi-
cation to the President than those designated by the Constitution? If
negative expressions apply to one case, so they do to the other.2"'
It is perhaps a sufficient response to Key's argument that the President is a
national officer in a way that neither Representatives nor Senators are, 20 2 but
another response is also possible. The states do not elect Presidents; presiden-
tial electors do, and the Constitution also contains a negatively-phrased Quali-
fications Clause for them: "no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an
Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elec-
tor."2 3 As Samuel Wood pointed out during the Peters debate:
If [the clause fixed the qualifications of electors], then foreigners,
non-residents, minors, persons convicted of crimes, &c., may be
appointed Presidential electors. Most of the States, if not all of them,
have fixed other qualifications as to age, residence, &c. Maryland
required, at one time, that six should be residents of the Western and
four of the Eastern Shore. Other States were divided into districts,
and electors were required to live in their districts. If States can add
to these negative inhibitions as to the qualifications of Presidential
electors, they certainly can do the same as to members of Con-
gress.2"
State practice is not necessarily a guide to constitutionality, however, as will
be discussed below, and the distinction between the qualifications for President
and those for presidential electors is a weak response to Key's criticism. The
qualifications for members of Congress are simply much more like those for
the President than those for presidential electors; any distinction between the
200. Article II, Section 1 provides:
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States at the time of
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall
any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-
five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
201. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 914 (1807); see also id. at 918 (statement of Rep. Howard) (point-
ing out that the Qualifications Clauses for both the President and Senators were negatively
phrased).
202. Representative Key, of course, responded that the members of Congress, who can declare
war for or levy taxes on the whole nation, are no less national representatives than the President.
Id. at 914. That argument, however, returns us to the nature of the Congress, discussed above. See
supra part II.B.
203. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
204. 15 CONG. REC. app. at 76 (1884). Justice Thomas made a similar argument in his Term
Limits dissent: "We have long understood that [the States] do have the power ... to set qualifica-
tions for their Presidential electors." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1883
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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two must therefore be based on the nature and object of the clauses rather than
the fact that they are negatively phrased. To repeat Joseph Story's admonition:
The truth is, that, in order to ascertain how far an affirmative or
negative provision excludes or implies others, we must look to the
nature of the provision, the subject-matter, the objects, and the scope
of the instrument. These, and these only, can properly determine the
rule of construction.2 5
The second criticism of Randolph's negative phrasing argument is one
recognized by the Supreme Court in Powell v. McCormack"° and summarily
accepted by the Term Limits majority.2"7 The Qualifications Clauses, as re-
ported to the Convention by the Committee of Detail, were originally phrased
positively. 2 8 The Committee of Style, which was appointed only "to revise
the stile of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to, 219 "had no
authority from the Convention to make alterations of substance in the Consti-
tution."2 ' Constitutional scholar Charles Warren thus treated the negatively-
phrased final clause and the positively-phrased draft clause as synony-
mous.21' As the Supreme Court subsequently recognized in Nixon v. United
States,2 2 however, "we must presume that the [Committee of Style's] re-
organization or rephrasing accurately captured what the Framers meant in their
unadorned language. ' 21 3 Thus, another explanation is at least equally plau-
sible: the Committee of Style changed the clause from positive to negative
phrasing because the negative phrasing more accurately reflected the intention
of the convention. The expressio unius concerns expressed by John Dickinson
in response to the positively phrased original version of the clause2 4 suggest
that the change was made deliberately, but it is impossible to tell from the
debates whether the other delegates to the convention agreed that the expressio
unius principle was implicated, and if so, whether such implication was a
cause for concern or an intended effect.
C. State Practice
The proponents of state power also argued that the common practice of
several of the states since the ratification of the Constitution was to impose
additional qualifications of one sort or another. Representative John Randolph
stated during the McCreery debate that such "was so obvious and natural" a
construction of the Qualifications Clauses "that it had been adopted by the
States, and acted upon from the commencement of the Government, without
205. 1 STORY, supra note 100, § 448, at 434.
206. 395 U.S. 486, 536 (1969).
207. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1849 n.8.
208. Powell, 395 U.S. at 536 (citing 2 Farrand, supra note 97, at 249-50).
209. Id. at 538 (quoting 2 FARRAND, supra note 97, at 553).
210. Id. at 539 (quoting CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 422 n.1
(1929)).
211. WARREN, supra note 210, at 422 n. I.
212. 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
213. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 737.
214. See supra text accompanying note 96.
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any man dreaming of, or starting an objection to it." 2 ' Representative Love
pointed out that "[iln perhaps every State in the Union, have laws been enact-
ed of a similar nature to" the district residency requirement at issue in
McCreery.2"6 Even Representative Alston pointed out that his own state of
North Carolina imposed a twelve-month district residency requirement,- al-
though "he had always believed that had the people of one district chosen to
elect a man from another district, possessing other qualifications as required
by the Constitution, he would be entitled to his seat."2"7
Similarly, during the Trumbull debate, Senator Toombs recognized "that
the constitutions of [perhaps] half the States in the Union have provisions in
them which may be declared void" if the Senate found that the Kansas provi-
sion at issue in the case was void,2 ' and Senator Mason recognized "that
there are many of the States in this Union who have considered themselves as
retaining a power to place qualifications or disqualifications upon the office of
Senator," though he himself thought the clauses exclusive.2 9 Samuel Wood,
during the Peters debate, presented a comprehensive listing of state-imposed
qualifications22  and cited the Supreme Court's statement in Stuart v.
Laird2' that "[a] contemporary exposition of the Constitution, practiced un-
der and acquiesced in for a period of years, fixes its construction. 222
There are two criticisms that can be made of this argument, and a recon-
ciling explanation. First, a number of the state constitutional provisions cited
do not actually impose additional qualifications on members of Congress.
Some clearly apply only to officers under the state constitution, and thus do
not include representatives to Congress. 29 Others are resign-to-run provi-
sions, and have the effect of rendering the state office vacant, not of disquali-
fying the state officer from Congress. 2 4 The answer to this criticism is that a
sufficient number of state constitutions 2 5 and state statutes 26 expressly
215. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 884 (1807).
216. Id. at 902.
217. Id. at 891.
218. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 466 (1856); see also id. at 550 (statement of Sen.
Pugh) (listing the state provisions).
219. Id. at 579-80.
220. 15 CONG. REC. app. at 78-81 (1884).
221. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 299 (1803).
222. 15 CONG. REC. 78 (1884) (quoting Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803));
see also Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 229 (1952) (arguing that the "[llong-continued" practice of
depriving presidential electors of the independence the Constitution designed "weigh[ed] heavily
in considering the constitutionality" of a Democrat Party requirement that electors pledge to sup-
port nominees of the Democratic Party).
223. See, e.g., TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. IX, § 3, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at
3421 (imposing a two-year ineligibility for office of "any person" bribing an elector); R.I. CONST.
of 1842, art. II, § 1, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3224-25 (setting property require-
ment and one-year residency requirement for voting); R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 1, reprinted in 6
THORPE, supra note 39, at 3231 ("No person shall be eligible to any civil office ... unless he be
a qualified elector for such office.").
224. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 8, reprinted in I THORPE, supra note 39, at
573 ("No member of Congress ... shall at any time hold or exercise the office of judge."); N.H.
CONST. of 1784, pt. 2, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 39, at 2469 ("No president or judge of
the supreme court shall hold ... any place or office ... from any other State, government, or
power whatever.").
225. See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1798, art. I, § 11, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 792
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imposed additional qualifications on members of Congress to suggest that state
legislators, at least, thought the practice constitutional.2
The second criticism is that frequent violations of the Constitution do not
make the practice any less unconstitutional. 28 As Representative Key stated
during the McCreery debate, "[v]iolations of the Constitution, by some of the
States, are now cited as precedents from which destructive conclusions are
drawn., 229 This criticism is all the more compelling when one considers, as
Key pointed out, that because residence in a district of a state was also neces-
sarily residence in the state itself, such state constitutional provisions could
never be judicially challenged in the House as long as they were complied
with. 2"1 But Key's criticism misses the point of Randolph's argument; it is
not that unconstitutional actions become constitutional by a sort of adverse
possession, 21 but that actions by the states, taken in many instances by the
very same people who drafted and/or ratified the Constitution, are strong evi-
dence of the intended meaning of the Constitution itself.
21 2
Finally, there is also an explanation of these state provisions that renders
them ineffectual, though not unconstitutional. As Senator Foot argued in the
Trumbull case, disqualifications "in the constitutions of several of the States
[are] regarded simply as the expression of a rule of policy or expediency for
the action of the Legislature or of the people, and merely advisory to them,
and not [as] having the force of a binding obligation., 233 To be sure, said
Foot, a disqualification clause "is entitled to respectful consideration, and
should have its proper degree of influence upon the action of the elective
power," but the clause is hortatory only, and the Senate would infringe the
(No member of the General Assembly shall, "after having taken his seat, be eligible to any [office
under this state or the United States] during the time for which he shall have been elected.").
226. See, e.g., Ga. Act of Feb. 11, 1799, setting a three-year state residency requirement on
members of Congress.
227. The Term Limits majority observed that "the number of state-imposed qualifications
[was] remarkably small," with only "one instance of a state-imposed property qualification ...
and five instances of district residency requirements." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S.
Ct. 1842, 1866 n.41 (1995). While 6 out of 50 might be "remarkably small," the majority seems
to forget that 6 instances of qualifications at the time of the founding amounts to nearly 50% of
the 13 State constitutions in effect at the time.
228. See, e.g., id. at 1864 ("One may properly question the extent to which the States' own
practice is a reliable indicator of the contours of restrictions that the Constitution imposed on
States .... ).
229. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 914 (1807).
230. Id.
231. Randolph's statement is susceptible to such an interpretation, however. Id. at 889 (state-
ment of Rep. Randolph) ("[Plractice, long established practice, under the Constitution, was the
best evidence what the Constitution was. Powers indisputably exercised by the States ever since its
adoption, were as much departed from the General Government, and imparted to the States, as if
especially delegated by the Constitution itself.").
232. The Supreme Court has recognized that the actions of the early Congresses are more
persuasive evidence of the Framers' intent than those of early state legislatures. As I have shown
above, however, in the only action of an early Congress on this subject, the McCreery case, Con-
gress deliberately avoided deciding the constitutional question. See supra part I.A. Other early
congressional actions, however, support the power of the states. As new states entered the union
with constitutional provisions establishing additional qualifications, Congress approved their state
constitutions as being in conformity with the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, by its own actions,
Congress gave its tacit approval to such provisions.
233. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 581 (1856).
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will of the people, not follow it, by following such a clause.234 While the
clauses to which Foot was pointing do not read as advisory clauses, his expla-
nation is a plausible one. More importantly, he points to an important problem
with Congress's refusing to seat a member who arrives with an otherwise
valid election certificate demonstrating the support of a majority of voters.235
That problem is addressed in more detail below.236
D. The Tenth Amendment as a Rule of Interpretation
Given the ambiguity surrounding the Qualifications Clauses described
above, the proponents of state power argued most vigorously that the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution required that the ambiguity be resolved in
favor of the states. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegat-
ed to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." '237  The
Amendment's implication on the qualifications issue was hotly contested in
each of the debates. Moreover, several different interpretations of the amend-
ment were suggested on both sides of the debates. I shall first attempt to sum-
marize the various interpretations and then suggest the one that I find most
persuasive.
First and foremost, the proponents of state power argued that the Tenth
Amendment established a rule of constitutional interpretation. Thus Represen-
tative Sawyer argued during the McCreery debate:
But even supposing that [members of Congress] should be im-
peded in their progress [of interpreting the Qualifications Clauses] by
the difficulty which a construction either way would produce, in
rendering a negative injury to the Constitution, or a positive one to
the States, still their doubts would be dispelled and their progress
made easy by another clause in the Constitution, and which was
added for the express purpose of clearing up all doubts that might
arise under its interpretation. It was this: whatever powers and author-
ities are not expressly238 delegated by the Constitution to the United
States, or necessarily arising under it, shall be reserved to the States
themselves, or to the people. Now, he hoped that a mere commence-
ment to exercise a certain power under the Constitution was not to be
considered as a complete termination of it, with regard to the States.
A right could not be said to be delegated absolutely, which may be
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See infra text accompanying note 265.
237. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
238. The language of the Tenth Amendment, of course, is "the powers not delegated," not
"the powers not expressly delegated." U.S. CONST. amend. X. A similar clause in the Articles of
Confederation included "expressly," but the word was deliberately dropped by Congress before
submitting the Tenth Amendment to the states for ratification. Compare ART. OF CONFED. of
1777, art. II, reprinted in I THORPE, supra note 39, at 10 with U.S. CONST. amend. X. Sawyer's
reading is not limited to powers "expressly delegated," however, but includes those powers "nec-
essarily arising" under the Constitution. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 880-81 (1807).
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exercised conjointly. He thought, therefore, that he could lay it down
as an undeniable rule, that the right which each State had to require a
person to become a resident of the district for which he may be elect-
ed, was not delegated expressly by the Constitution, for there were no
words in it to that effect, neither did it flow from a necessary opera-
tion of any of its provisions; therefore, it must belong to the States
themselves, or to the people." 9
Sawyer's interpretation of the Tenth Amendment to some extent begs the
question about the nature and purpose of the Qualifications Clauses. As the
proponents of an exclusive interpretation argued, the clauses comprehensively
regulated qualifications for members of Congress," ' and thereby, by neces-
sary implication, prohibited the states from entering the field themselves.
Therefore, the Tenth Amendment was not relevant.2 41 Anticipating Sawyer's
argument, Representative Sturges stated:
It was not by any means a necessary, but, as . . . [I] conceive[], a
forced application, that, because the States were not prohibited in
express terms, they did possess the right. The implication was, in his
opinion, directly the reverse. But it had been, and would undoubtedly
be urged, though it had not yet been stated in the debate, that whatev-
er powers were not expressly denied in the Constitution to the States,
or, in other words, what had not expressly been granted by the States
to the General Government, was retained by the States. He acceded to
the correctness of the position generally. But a distinction was to be
observed in those cases where, from the nature of the subject, there
was no incompatibility; where there was no clashing in the concurrent
exercise of powers by the General and the State Governments, the
principle would apply; but in those cases where, from the nature of
the subject, there would be an incompatibility, the principle could not,
and ought not to apply. For instance, in attending to the legislative
powers granted to the General Government by the eighth section of
the first article of the Constitution, they found that Congress had the
power "to lay and collect taxes." In this clause the same power was
not denied to the States, and it was retained by them. But why? Be-
cause, from the nature of the subject, there would, in its exercise, be
no interference with the General Government. In the seventh clause
of the same section and article, Congress have the power "to establish
post offices and post roads." A power over the same subject was not
in express terms denied to the States. But had the States a right to
establish post offices and post roads? He answered, no. Why not? For
the reason and on account of the distinction he had men-
tioned-because, from the nature of the subject, were they to exercise
239. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 880-81 (1807).
240. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (1856) (statement of Sen. Crittenden)
("The Constitution of the United States decides upon the whole matter .... ").
241. The Term Limits majority made a similar point: "The Qualifications Clauses were in-
tended to preclude the States from exercising any such power and to fix as exclusive the qualifica-
tions in the Constitution." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1856 (1995).
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the power, there would be an interference with the powers of Con-
gress; and there would be a serious inconvenience, for it was desir-
able, and, indeed, indispensable, that there should be a uniformity in
the laws regulating post offices and post roads. So in the case now
before the Committee. Should the States be allowed the power to
determine the qualifications of the elected, more especially where
they have the right to superadd, after the Constitution had enumerated
certain qualifications, that incompatibility, that interference of powers
which he had mentioned would exist.
42
Of course, Sturges's position also begs the question about the nature of the
Qualifications Clauses. Significantly, though, the examples he cited involve
express delegations of power to Congress. The Qualifications Clauses do not
read as a delegation of power at all, either to Congress or to the States;
243
rather, they read as a limitation on power, and since no power over the subject
is granted to Congress, either expressly or by necessary implication, the power
that the clauses 'limit must be a state power.2" The Tenth Amendment does
not help answer how far the limitation on state power should extend, but the
Supreme Court has stated that implied prohibitions on state power are
disfavored. 245 That rule, when combined with the Tenth Amendment, sug-
gests that the limitation, or prohibition, on state power is not to be expanded
beyond that actually required by the constitutional text. As Thomas Jefferson
wrote in 1814:
Had the Constitution been silent nobody can doubt but that the right
to prescribe all the qualifications and disqualifications of those they
would send to represent them would have belonged to the State. So,
also, the Constitution might have prescribed the whole and excluded
all others. It seems to have preferred the middle way. It has exercised
the power in part by declaring some disqualifications .... But it
does not declare itself that the member shall not be a lunatic, a pau-
242. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 877-78 (1807).
243. Cf supra text accompanying note 185.
244. As discussed above, the proponents of an exclusive interpretation rejected this under-
standing of state power. See supra part II.E. Thus, Representative Alston argued during the
McCreery debate that because "[tlhe Constitution, in speaking of Representatives, had neither said
the States should assign qualifications, nor that they might," the states had no power to impose
qualifications, and anyone meeting the constitutional list was eligible to a seat in Congress. 17
ANNALS OF CONG. 892 (1807) (emphasis added). Similarly, Representative Rowan stated that
"[nlo power had been given to the State sovereignties to superadd qualifications .... " Id. at 894.
The fallacy of this argument is that it treats the states as creatures of the Constitution. Rowan him-
self stated, "that, as to the purpose of electing members to the lower House of Congress, the
States were to the Union what counties were to a State," id., a proposition vigorously rejected by
Representative Randolph. Id. Representative Key offered a less extreme version of the same argu-
ment that implicitly relied on the nature of a power over congressional elections: "I lay it down as
a political truth, that the States, in their sovereign capacities, have no power, right, or authority to
interfere with the elections of Representatives to Congress, except so far as the Constitution of the
United States gives them special powers so to do." Id. at 912. Because the only grant of state
power, according to Key, was the Article 1, Section 4 Time, Place and Manner Clause, the states
had no power to superadd qualifications. Id.
245. As Justice Thomas noted in his Term Limits dissent, the Court is reluctant "to read con-
stitutional provisions to preclude state power by negative implication." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1887 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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per, a convict of treason, of murder, of felony, or other infamous
crime, or non-resident of his district. Nor does it prohibit to the State
the power of declaring these or any other disqualifications which its
particular circumstances may call for; and these may be different in
different States. Of course, then, by the tenth amendment, the power
is reserved to the State.2"
A second counter to Sawyer's view of the Tenth Amendment as a rule of
interpretation recognizes that the reserved powers clause of the Tenth Amend-
ment is bifurcated; powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to
the States, are reserved to the States or to the people.247 The opponents of
state power to add qualifications interpreted the bifurcation in two slightly dif-
ferent ways, but both interpretations operate in their view to deprive the states
of the power to add qualifications.
First, as Representative Quincy argued during the McCreery debate, power
is reserved either to the states or to the people depending on the nature of the
power:
As to rights reserved, now came in the tenth amendment to the Con-
stitution, cited by the gentleman from Virginia on his right, which
speaks of rights reserved to the States, or to the people. What rights?
When the whole right of voting was the subject of consideration, as it
was at the formation of the Constitution, the exclusion of a part was
the inclusion of the remainder. The Constitution had said that certain
persons should not have a fight to be elected members of this House:
was not this a declaration that all others might? This was a fight then
which was reserved to the people, and not to the States.
24
Representative Key made a similar argument, and specified precisely how the
people were to exercise their reserved rights:
To form a correct idea of this subject, and of the true meaning of
the article of reserved powers, it is only necessary to trace with preci-
sion in what body the power was originally lodged; to that body it is
reserved. If it was lodged in the States as sovereignties, then the
reservation is to the States in that capacity; but if it was a power in
the people, and such as the States in their sovereign capacity never
had exercised or could exercise, (as in the present case,) then it was
reserved to the people, to be used or controlled by them in the man-
ner prescribed by the Constitution.249
There are two problems with Quincy and Key's argument. First, it fails to
recognize that "the people" might be either the people of the state or the
people of the whole United States. Second, in treating "the people" as only the
people of the whole United States, the argument, especially as articulated by
246. Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell, quoied in 15 CONG. REC. app. at 84 (1884) (Rep.
Wood).
247. U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
248. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 908 (1807).
249. Id. at 917.
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Key, makes the clause redundant; it says, in effect, that the people have a
reserved power to amend the Constitution, the same power to amend already
prescribed in Article V.25
The second interpretation of the bifurcation of reserved powers rests on a
temporal view of the clause. Thus, as Representative Howard stated during the
McCreery debate, "no power could be imparted by the States to the General
Government, or reserved from it, which was not previously possessed by
them."25' Joseph Story offers a similar interpretation in his Commentaries on
the Constitution,252 and Representative Elliott elaborated on the interpretation
during the Peters debate:
Congress such as we now have under the Constitution is a crea-
ture of that instrument, and the States did not prior to the birth of the
National Government possess the right to send representatives to a
congress which had no existence; and it is seemingly clear that they
did not possess the power to prescribe qualifications for representa-
tives to a body unknown to the world until the adoption of the Feder-
al Constitution. I think it is very plain that article 10 of the amend-
ments to the Constitution can have no application to the question
involved in this case. The right of the people of the States to send
Representatives to the Congress of the United States is not a right
growing out of the sovereignty of the respective States. The right to
elect Representatives to Congress does not spring from the State
governments, but is a right growing out of the formation of the Na-
tional Government. The States could not have reserved powers they
did not possess.253
Samuel Wood countered, however, that the states did have the power to
choose their representatives to the national government prior to 1787:
250. Justice Thomas made the same point in his Term Limits dissent: "To be sure, when the
Tenth Amendment uses the phrase 'the people,' it does not specify whether it is referring to the
people of each State or the people of the Nation as a whole. But the latter interpretation would
make the Amendment pointless .... U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1876
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
251. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 919 (1807) (emphasis added). The Term Limits majority relied
heavily on this argument. "[T]he power to add qualifications is not part of the original powers of
sovereignty that the Tenth Amendment reserved to the States .... [T]hat Amendment could only
,reserve' that which existed before." Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1854. "With respect to setting
qualifications for service in Congress, no such ight existed before the Constitution was ratified."
Id. at 1855. "[E]lecting representatives to the National Legislature was a new right, arising from
the Constitution itself." Id. at 1856. Apart from the fact that the states did have power to impose
qualifications on the representatives to the national legislature under the Articles of Confederation,
a fact which the Term Limits majority ignored, the majority misconstrues the Tenth Amendment.
As Justice Thomas correctly asserted:
[Ilt was not the state governments that were doing the reserving. The Constitution de-
rives its authority instead from the consent of the people of the States. Given the fun-
damental principle that all governmental powers stem from the people of the States, it
would simply be incoherent to assert that the people of the States could not reserve any
powers that they had not previously controlled.
Id. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
252. 2 STORY, supra note 100, §§ 626-627, at 101-03.
253. 15 CONG. REC. 3297 (1884).
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When the Constitution of the United States was formed the right of
each State to be represented in Congress existed under the Confedera-
tion, and was reserved with certain limitations. It would be nonsense
to say that the Constitution of the United States delegates to the State
the right to send Representatives to Congress. It was sovereign States,
which had just secured their independence, that met in convention for
the purpose of forming "a more perfect Union.
254
Congress was not the creature of the Constitution, asserted Wood, because, as
the Supreme Court recognized in Lane County v. Oregon,2" "Both the States
and the United States existed before the Constitution."2"6 As Wood elaborat-
ed:
If the States and the United States existed before the Constitution,
then representation, as stated by Judge Story, is not, as I have said, a
creature of the Constitution, but existed prior to its adoption, and the
article I have quoted is an inhibition on the States and not a grant of
power."'
Similarly, Senator Pugh stated during the Trumbull debate:
It is suggested, however, that the Legislatures of the States derive
their power of electing Senators from the Constitution of the United
States, and not from their respective State constitutions. But this, if
admitted to its full extent, will be found immaterial. It is not a power
conferred on any Legislature as a matter of gift or permission from
the Federal Government, but as a matter of right-and because the
Legislature represents the people, and acts only as an agent for the
people ....
. . . [T]he Senate is only the Congress of the Confederation re-
modeled. Hence, pursuing a usage even older than the Declaration of
Independence, the power of electing Senators is not conferred on the
State Legislatures by the Constitution of the United States, but is
recognized as existing in them, previously, as the agents of State
sovereignty and the impersonations of State independence.258
The best counter to both aspects of the bifurcation argument was given by
John Randolph during the McCreery debate. He argued that a proper under-
standing of the Tenth Amendment
lay in a dexterous use of the word "States." In geography, it implied
a portion of country within certain limits. In politics, it might mean
the government of that portion of country, or the people inhabiting it,
as socially and politically connected. The Framers of the Constitution
well knew that in some States, as in Connecticut, the power of the
Government was commensurate with that of the people in their origi-
254. Id. app. at 87.
255. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1865).
256. 15 CONG. REC. app. at 75 (citing Lane County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 76).
257. Id. app. at 76-77.
258. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 550 (1856).
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nal sovereign capacity; that in others, as in Virginia, it was very
limited. When therefore the Constitution makes a reservation of pow-
er "to the States, or to the people," it merely declares that the State
Government shall possess the power where not forbidden by its own
peculiar constitution; but where not allowed to exercise such a power
by its own constitution, it shall remain with the people.259
Thus, when one takes to heart James Wilson's admonition to remember that
the people operate in a dual capacity, the Tenth Amendment does provide the
rule of interpretation that answers the inquiry. Since the people of the whole
United States, via the Constitution, have neither delegated the power of adding
qualifications to the United States, either expressly or by necessary implica-
tion, nor prohibited the power to the states, again either expressly2" or by
necessary implication, the power is reserved to the states, or to the people of
the states, as the people of each state determine according to their own consti-
tutions. The people of the whole, of course, also have a reserved power to
alter this allocation of power, but their reserved power is found in the Article
V amendment clause, not in the Tenth Amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court stated in Powell v. McCormack that, by its decision to
seat Representative McCreery in 1807, the House of Representatives had de-
termined that the Constitution prevented the States from imposing additional
qualifications on members of Congress.26" ' The Court erroneously relied upon
an Elections Committee report that was rejected by the House, however, and
the House seemed deliberately to avoid deciding the constitutional issue when
it voted to seat McCreery. The subsequent decision by the Senate in 1856 to
seat Lyman Trumbull was equally ambiguous on the constitutional issue.
Moreover, although the decision by the House to seat Representative Peters in
1884 unambiguously found such action by states to be unconstitutional, the
decision by the House just fifteen years later in refusing a seat to Brigham
Roberts renders the 1884 decision at least suspect, and may overturn it entire-
ly.
Given such ambiguity in the congressional precedents, I have explored the
strength of the arguments, pro and con, made during the debates. I have tried
to convey each argument in the words of its strongest proponent, and also
have offered the various counters to each of the arguments made by the partic-
ipants of the several debates. In the end, the arguments against the exclusive
interpretation of the Qualifications Clauses, and in favor of the power of states
to superadd to the qualifications listed in them, are stronger and more consis-
tent, both logically and with the historical record and the nature of the Ameri-
can regime. Such an interpretation leaves the states free to impose all sorts of
qualifications, however, perhaps even some that are unrepublican in nature.
259. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 943 (1807).
260. Compare the express prohibitions on state power contained in U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
261. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 543 (1969); see supra part I.A.
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Although the Fourteenth Amendment has provided the courts with numerous
tools by which to counter such abuses, Senator Pugh offered the definitive pre-
Fourteenth Amendment response to those who warned of such abuses:
I revere the Constitution of the United States and the Union
established by it as sincerely and as devotedly as any Senator upon
this floor, and I would go as far as any Senator to maintain them to
the full extent of all the powers which have been delegated by the
people of the States. But, sir, although I regard it as a Constitution
appropriate for our Federal form of Government, it never occurs to
me that it is by implication to be carried further, and to the destruc-
tion and overthrow of the State constitutions and governments. When
the people of the States meet in their conventions, to frame their own
constitutions, they have some little modicum of wisdom left to them.
They are able to provide wise restrictions. They have the experience
and the whole history of this Government down to the present time to
guide them. It seems to me that all arguments addressed to our fears,
that the States may affix unworthy restrictions or improper restric-
tions can safely be answered by declaring that the people are not only
the source of authority, but the source of wisdom. 62
Ultimately, any experiment in self-government, and especially the American
experiment, which is based on that principle more than any other regime, has
to depend upon the wisdom of the people if it is to succeed.
I have postponed until now the discussion of one problem this interpreta-
tion raises, however; that of enforcement. Article I, Section 5 of the Constitu-
tion provides, "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members.""26 If, by this clause, each House of
Congress is empowered to judge all such qualifications, including those added
by the states, two problems immediately arise. First, as Senator Foot pointed
out during the Trumbull debate, the Congress would have to consult "the con-
stitutions and laws of [every State in the Union] in order to determine the
constitutional right to a seat . . . of its own members. ' 26 This power to
judge the qualifications would thus make Congress the final interpreter of state
constitutions and laws. In other words, the clause would give to the represen-
tatives of the whole nation the power to alter or nullify state constitutional
provisions of particular states, not because they were not in conformity with
the national constitution, but by the power to interpret.
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262. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 583 (1856).
263. U.S. CONST. art I, § 5 (emphasis added).
264. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 581 (1856).
265. Of course, Congress also has the power to judge election returns. Most such cases, how-
ever, involve allegations of vote fraud; Congress is thus judging questions of fact rather than ques-
tions of law, a power that is much less intrusive on state authority. Some state laws might be
implicated by Congress's power to judge elections, however, such as the Illinois constitutional
provision at issue in the Trumbull case, which provided that all votes cast for an ineligible judge
were void. See ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, § 10, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 999.
The potential conflict with state authority is no less in such a case than in the case of Congress
judging state qualifications. The Term Limits majority, therefore, made too much of the issue
when it states, "[t]he Constitution's provision for each House to be the judge of its own qualifica-
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Second, even assuming that Congress was up to the task of being the final
interpreter of State constitutions and laws, it would, if it refused to seat a
member for being disqualified under a state constitutional provision, be placed
in the awkward position of rejecting the interpretation the people and/or the
legislature of the state had placed on its own constitution and worse, depriving
the majority will expressed in the particular election of any force.
One answer to these concerns is to interpret the Article I, Section 5 power
to judge qualifications as a power to judge only the constitutionally mandated
qualifications. Such a solution does a disservice to the language of the clause,
however, and it may afford a political minority in a particular state little reme-
dy for occasional abuses. Representative Peters was clearly unqualified under
the Kansas Constitution; his election therefore clearly violated the express and
deliberate will of the people of Kansas, as articulated in that Constitution.2
Depriving the House of the power to judge the Kansas qualification would
undermine the power of the people of the several states to fix certain restric-
tions upon themselves.
A second answer to such concerns is for the state to regulate the manner
of enforcement as well as the qualifications. As we have seen, the Illinois
Constitution of 1848, by declaring that all votes cast for an ineligible candi-
date were void, attempted (unsuccessfully) to do just that.267 The Illinois en-
forcement provision did nothing to address the majority rule concern, however,
and when the Senate chose not to enforce the provision itself, it proved of
little value. The Arkansas term limit initiative invalidated in Term Limits
would have taken the Illinois solution one step further. It did not impose an
absolute disqualification, but merely denied a place on the ballot to those
candidates the people of the state wanted to disqualify. Because such candi-
dates could still have run as write-in candidates, and could have served if
elected, the will of a majority in the face of even the disqualification would
not necessarily have been thwarted. 6" More importantly, because of the na-
ture of a ballot access restriction, any dispute over the qualification would
never have reached the Congress; the Article I, Section 5 power to judge
qualifications would thus not have been infringed.
The Arkansas solution had one additional benefit. It took advantage of the
states as laboratories in self-government, a feature of the American federal
system of government praised by such prominent commentators as Alexis de
Tocqueville and Justice Louis Brandeis. As the pressure to reform government
may ultimately find its way into a constitutional amendment limiting the terms
of members of Congress, state experimentation would have increased the
tions thus provides further evidence that the Framers believed that the primary source of those
qualifications would be federal law." U.S. Term Limits, Inc, v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1859
(1995) (emphasis added).
266. See supra part I.C.
267. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, § 10, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 999.
268. Opponents of the Arkansas measure pointed out that write-in campaigns are rarely won,
and thus that such a provision is really no option at all. The history of write-in campaigns has
typically not involved incumbents, however, so a write-in option might well be more viable than
the success rate of past write-in campaigns would suggest.
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likelihood that the qualifications ultimately agreed upon would be the best that
could be devised; errors at the state level are simply more easily corrected
than those committed in an amendment to the national constitution.

